



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file *Voire référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

FLEETING POPULARITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN CANADA

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies
of
The University of Guelph

by
JANICE E. BARNES

In partial fulfilment of requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
May, 1993

© Janice Barnes, 1993



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-81625-2

Canada

Name Janice Elizabeth BARNES

Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most nearly describes the content of your dissertation. Enter the corresponding four-digit code in the spaces provided.

Political Science

0615

U·M·I

SUBJECT TERM

SUBJECT CODE

Subject Categories

THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS	
Architecture	0729
Art History	0377
Cinema	0900
Dance	0378
Fine Arts	0357
Information Science	0723
Journalism	0391
Library Science	0399
Mass Communications	0708
Music	0413
Speech Communication	0459
Theater	0465
EDUCATION	
General	0515
Administration	0514
Adult and Continuing	0516
Agricultural	0517
Art	0273
Bilingual and Multicultural	0282
Business	0688
Community College	0275
Curriculum and Instruction	0727
Early Childhood	0518
Elementary	0524
Finance	0277
Guidance and Counseling	0319
Health	0680
Higher	0745
History of	0520
Home Economics	0278
Industrial	0521
Language and Literature	0279
Mathematics	0280
Music	0522
Philosophy of	0998
Physical	0523

Psychology	0525
Reading	0535
Religious	0527
Sciences	0714
Secondary	0535
Social Sciences	0534
Sociology of	0340
Special	0529
Teacher Training	0530
Technology	0710
Tests and Measurements	0288
Vocational	0747
LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS	
Language	
General	0679
Ancient	0289
Linguistics	0290
Modern	0291
Literature	
General	0401
Classical	0294
Comparative	0295
Medieval	0297
Modern	0298
African	0316
American	0591
Asian	0305
Canadian (English)	0352
Canadian (French)	0355
English	0593
Germanic	0311
Latin American	0312
Middle Eastern	0315
Romance	0313
Slavic and East European	0314

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND THEOLOGY	
Philosophy	0422
Religion	
General	0318
Biblical Studies	0321
Clergy	0319
History of	0320
Philosophy of	0322
Theology	0469
SOCIAL SCIENCES	
American Studies	0323
Anthropology	
Archaeology	0324
Cultural	0326
Physical	0327
Business Administration	
General	0310
Accounting	0272
Banking	0770
Management	0454
Marketing	0338
Canadian Studies	0385
Economics	
General	0501
Agricultural	0503
Commerce-Business	0505
Finance	0508
History	0509
Labor	0510
Theory	0511
Folklore	0358
Geography	0366
Gerontology	0351
History	
General	0578

Ar-ient	0579
Medieval	0581
Modern	0582
Black	0328
African	0331
Asia, Australia and Oceania	0332
Canadian	0334
European	0335
Latin American	0336
Middle Eastern	0333
United States	0337
History of Science	0585
Law	0398
Political Science	
General	0615
International Law and Relations	0616
Public Administration	0617
Recreation	0814
Social Work	0452
Sociology	
General	0626
Criminology and Penology	0627
Demography	0938
Ethnic and Racial Studies	0631
Individual and Family Studies	0628
Industrial and Labor Relations	0629
Public and Social Welfare	0630
Social Structure and Development	0700
Theory and Methods	0344
Transportation	0709
Urban and Regional Planning	0999
Women's Studies	0453

THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES	
Agricuture	
General	0473
Agronomy	0285
Animal Culture and Nutrition	
Animal Pathology	0475
Food Science and Technology	0476
Forestry and Wildlife	0359
Plant Culture	0478
Plant Pathology	0479
Plant Physiology	0480
Range Management	0817
Wood Technology	0777
Biology	
General	0746
Anatomy	0306
Biostatistics	0287
Botany	0308
Cell	0309
Ecology	0379
Entomology	0329
Genetics	0353
Limnology	0369
Microbiology	0793
Molecular	0410
Neuroscience	0307
Oceanography	0317
Physiology	0416
Radiation	0433
Veterinary Science	0821
Zoology	0778
Zoology	0472
Biophysics	
General	0786
Medical	0760
EARTH SCIENCES	
Inorganic Chemistry	0425
Organic Chemistry	0496

Geodesy	0370
Geology	0372
Geophysics	0373
Hydrology	0388
Mineralogy	0411
Paleobotany	0345
Paleoecology	0426
Paleontology	0418
Paleozoology	0985
Palynology	0427
Physical Geography	0368
Physical Oceanography	0415
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES	
Environmental Sciences	0768
Health Sciences	
General	0566
Audiology	0300
Chemotherapy	0992
Dentistry	0567
Education	0350
Hospital Management	0769
Human Development	0758
Immunology	0982
Medicine and Surgery	0564
Mental Health	0347
Nursing	0569
Nutrition	0570
Obstetrics and Gynecology	0380
Occupational Health and Therapy	0354
Ophthalmology	0381
Pathology	0571
Pharmacology	0419
Pharmacy	0572
Physiotherapy	0382
Physical Therapy	0573
Public Health	0574
Radiology	0574
Recreation	0575

Speech Pathology	0460
Toxicology	0383
Home Economics	0386
PHYSICAL SCIENCES	
Pure Sciences	
Chemistry	
General	0485
Agricultural	0749
Analytical	0486
Biochemistry	0487
Inorganic	0488
Nuclear	0738
Organic	0490
Pharmaceutical	0491
Physical	0494
Polymer	0495
Radiation	0754
Mathematics	0405
Physics	
General	0605
Acoustics	0986
Astronomy and Astrophysics	0606
Atmospheric Science	0608
Atomic	0748
Electronics and Electricity	0607
Elementary Particles and High Energy	0798
Fluid and Plasma	0759
Molecular	0609
Nuclear	0610
Optics	0752
Radiation	0756
Solid State	0611
Statistics	0463
Applied Sciences	
Applied Mechanics	0346
Computer Science	0984

Engineering	
General	0537
Aerospace	0538
Agricultural	0539
Automotive	0540
Biomedical	0541
Chemical	0542
Civil	0543
Electronics and Electrical	0544
Heat and Thermodynamics	0348
Hydraulic	0545
Industrial	0546
Marine	0547
Materials Science	0794
Mechanical	0548
Metallurgy	0743
Mining	0551
Nuclear	0552
Packaging	0549
Petroleum	0765
Sanitary and Municipal	0554
System Science	0790
Geotechnolgy	0428
Operations Research	0796
Plastics Technology	0795
Textile Technology	0994
PSYCHOLOGY	
General	0621
Behavioral	0384
Clinical	0622
Developmental	0620
Experimental	0623
Industrial	0624
Personality	0625
Physiological	0989
Psychobiology	0349
Psychometrics	0632
Social	0451



UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

BARNES

surname

Janice Elizabeth

given names

Political Studies

department

918-009-260

I.D. number

M.A.

program


CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL (MASTER'S THESIS)

We, the undersigned, hereby certify that the thesis presented by the above-named candidate in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree


Master of ARTS

is worthy of acceptance and may now be formally submitted to the Dean of Graduate Studies.

Title: Fleeting Popularity: A Critical Analysis of Political Leadership in Canada


i. 
Chair, Master's Examination Committee

ii. 
Advisor

iii. 

iv. _____

Date: January 22, 1993

Received by: 
for Dean of Graduate Studies

Date: MAY 7 1993

ABSTRACT

**FLEETING POPULARITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN CANADA**

Janice Barnes
University of Guelph, 1992

Advisor:
Professor Pat Kyba

This thesis is a study in public perception of Canadian leaders. Specifically, it is an examination of the relative popularity of federal party leaders and Prime Ministers over two decades.

This thesis will argue that despite the preeminence of the Prime Minister, his popularity is destined to decline. This erosion of popularity also rings true for other federal party leaders. This can be attributed to various factors; partisanship, the state of the economy and the media, to name a few. It will be argued in this study that the latter of the three will be considered the most plausible explanation.

It is thus inevitable that leaders in this country receive but a glimpse of popularity, and in looking to the future there appears no reason to expect any change.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Professor Pat Kyba. The support and encouragement he has extended to me during my program has given me both the desire and confidence to succeed.

I would also like to lend my extreme gratitude to Maureen Mancuso for the commitment and enthusiasm she has brought with her to this University. Maureen, you have also been a great friend!

My gravest appreciation also must go to Troy Harrison for without Troy much of this thesis could not be completed. Troy, I am truly grateful for your time, patience and above all, for your humour.

To Cheryl Moore I extend my sincere thanks for the precious typing assistance - it was truly appreciated.

For her friendship and support, I extend great thanks to Mary Sue Maloughney. To the Gallants' - Thanks for the computer, you have been most patient and kind. To Tim, thanks for sticking by me and finally to my parents for not only supporting me in this endeavour but believing, from day one, that I could accomplish it!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER ONE.....	10
RELATIONAL PHENOMENON.....	15
PRIME-MINISTERIAL LIFE CYCLE.....	16
TASKS OF THE PRIME MINISTER.....	22
LEADERSHIP STYLES.....	25
CHAPTER TWO.....	34
PARTY LEADER.....	38
MASTER OF HIS CABINET.....	40
POLICY FORMATION.....	43
RELATIONS WITH THE CROWN.....	46
PREMINENCE OF TRUDEAU.....	47
PREMINENCE OF MULRONEY.....	50
HOUSE OF COMMONS.....	53
CHAPTER THREE.....	56
LEADER IMAGES.....	56
POLITICAL SUPPORT.....	67
CHAPTER FOUR.....	69
Pierre Trudeau.....	71
Ed Broadbent.....	73
John Turner.....	75
Brian Mulroney.....	76
Media.....	77
Leaders and Issues.....	79
Data Assessment.....	81
CHAPTER FIVE.....	86
MEDIA'S ROLE.....	86
TELEVISION.....	93
METHOD TO THE MADNESS.....	98
RELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERS AND MEDIA.....	104
CONCLUSION.....	112

Introduction

Perhaps no question is as central to political discourse as that of political leadership. For if there is an "irreducible fact" of politics, it is that in any political society some shall be the rulers and some the ruled. [Dahl and Neubauer 1968:251]

Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomenon on earth. Political leadership, though clearly different from other forms of leadership, is still very much misunderstood. Yet, the literature available on this subject is extensive. In essence, there have been two main approaches to the study of political leadership - prescriptive and descriptive. The prescriptive works are vast ; men and women have always tendered opinions on how leaders ought to lead. Equally as vast are the descriptive works that delve into the role of the leader and the traits that make one a successful leader.

Many of the older, more descriptive, approaches to leadership dealt with as Daniel Bell argues; "the image of the mindless masses...and the strong willed leader".[Taras and Weyant 1988: 3] William James, an American philosopher and psychologist influenced by the writings of Charles Darwin, argued that the critical issue is not how great people are produced but rather how they are selected by particular societies at particular times.[Taras and Weyant 1988: 4]. The essential question is why certain persons with certain

attributes were chosen as leaders or heroes while others were ignored.

Thomas Carlyle in On Heroes and Hero Worship argues that:

Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of Great Men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great ones...[Carlyle 1947: 17].

For Carlyle, the appearance of the leader, rather hero, was a mystical event, separate from and above mundane social forces.

If history is the product of great persons, then, as Barbara Kellerman has written, "without Moses the Jews would have stayed in Egypt; without Lenin there would have been no Russia Revolution; without Churchill the Nazis would have conquered Great Britain." [Kellerman 1986: 12] If, on the other hand, leaders are products of particular forces and events and cannot shape outcomes, then "greatness" cannot in fact be thrust on individuals.

Existing studies have made some progress insofar as they have discredited the "great man" approach to leadership. This approach still has followers who purport that a leadership position is dependent on the possession of certain physical and psychological traits. These so-called important traits include height, weight, intelligence, self-confidence, an urge to dominate and so on. However, the actual study of individuals in leadership positions has produced no universal set of traits common to all of them. [Mughan and Patterson

1991: 4]. Moreover, individuals with the hypothetically relevant traits were all too often found not to be in positions of leadership.

With the death of the "great man" debate came many of the more recent works which discuss whether leaders do in fact, affect the outcome of events - whether leaders make a difference. To some, the evidence that leaders are pivotal to every political situation is overwhelming. Evidence has been presented by Valerie Bunce, for instance, that political leadership has made a difference in the types of policies that have been enacted in both Western and Eastern European countries.[Bunce 1981] Their influence is felt especially during so-called honeymoon periods just after an election, when they are given a fresh mandate to establish policies and priorities.

James David Barber, influenced by Bunce's, work takes the same stance. He argues:

Who the President is at a given time can make a profound difference in the whole thrust and direction of national politics... even the most superficial speculation confirms the common sense view that the man himself weighs heavy among other historical factors.[Taras and Weyant 1988: 5].

Certainly this approach to leadership is understandable in that every leader has a distinct identity.

In terms of the more prescriptive approaches to leadership, R.M. Punnett in The Prime Minister in Canadian Government and Politics provides a "how to" manual for

prospective prime ministers. He discusses the road to the prime ministership in five stages. Once one has achieved the role, Punnett further analyzes the necessary traits one must possess in order to maintain the title. He argues that the relationship between the Prime Minister and the rest of Canadians is extremely volatile. In keeping with this, one can argue that projecting a positive image is paramount in maintaining the prime ministership.

Bruce Mazlish in "Leader and Led" concludes that the leader, in addition to actually organizing a political or religious movement, i.e. his reality role, himself becomes an image, a symbol... As an image or symbol, he brings to focus all of their feelings, binding the followers and these feelings to himself.[Mazlish 1986:277]. If he disappears from the scene, these feelings are set loose again, available for other, competing leaders to try and refocus in a new combination.[Mazlish 1986: 278]. Mazlish illustrates elements that aid in understanding a leader's rise to power and their subsequent fall from grace.

Robert Craig Brown in "Fishwives, Plutocrats, Sirens and other Curious Creatures: Some Questions about Political Leadership in Canada" argues that public perceptions of leadership are "partial, shifting, and transitory." [Brown 1988:27]. He postulates, through a comparative analysis of various Prime Ministers, that one must take into account the unique personalities of our leaders and how they have viewed

the constraints of our political institutions, our history, and the circumstances in which they led.

Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke analyze political support through an in depth analysis of national surveys beginning in 1970. The materials gathered in the surveys, together with those from the earlier election studies and other sources, provide an extensive portrait of public political attitudes and behavior in Canada during a period when the country was experiencing economic problems, but which always had an impact on support for the political system and its leaders.

Colin Campbell employs both a prescriptive and comparative approach to demonstrate that the problems faced by chief executives are similar.[Campbell 1980: 51-93]. Through an examination of George Bush's reorganization of the White House, Thatcher's manipulation of the Cabinet immediately prior to the Falkland's War, and Mulroney's tinkering with Trudeau's Cabinet system, Brown demonstrates how each chief executive used selected strategies and coping mechanisms in an attempt to strike a balance between the need to be re-elected on the one hand and the effective oversight of the executive branch on the other.

This study will attempt to complement these and other works by providing a theoretical analysis of political leadership. More specifically, this thesis will address the issue of public perception and its effects on any leader.

Leader, for the purposes of this work, may be defined as someone who directs or guides a political party. So, not only will Prime Ministers be assessed but in the analysis of the media and political institutions, national party leaders will be examined as well. A comparative study will be conducted through the use of election survey data and Gallup poll data to evaluate the relative popularity of leaders over a select period of time.

Having stated the focus of the thesis, pertinent questions come to mind. What is it about certain prime ministers that enable them to remain in the good graces of the public longer than others? Is it a characteristic inherent in the leaders themselves? In other words, do they possess a certain characteristic that renders them different enough from their predecessors and competitors to maintain popularity over a longer period of time? Is the general Canadian public fickle and only by sheer luck is a leader able to maintain popularity? What about leadership style - how important is it in maintaining widespread acceptance? In other words, if a leader possesses a charismatic style,¹ is he any more likely to remain in the good graces of the public longer than someone who does not? What explanations can account for the decline in popularity of leaders? Partisanship? Economy? Media?

In sum this thesis will argue that: 1. All leaders seek

¹ Charisma will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapters.

to legitimize their authority in the eyes of the governed. 2. All leaders eventually have their support eroded. 3. Though this fact may be true, some leaders have managed to stay in the good graces of the public longer than others. 4. The pre-eminence of the Prime Minister is an outgrowth of the incumbent's relationship with the public, the formal executive, the party and the Cabinet. Canadians, for this reason, tend to focus far greater on the Prime Minister as opposed to the institutions themselves. 5. The media, specifically television, is a plausible explanation to account for the decline in popularity of leaders in Canada. 6. Despite the preeminence of both Trudeau and Mulroney, both declined in popularity. It will be noted that Trudeau's support did not decline as rapidly as Mulroney's. A brief chapter by chapter outline will illustrate these central principles.

Chapter one will lay the foundation for the thesis. Included in this chapter will be a broadly defined concept of political leadership. The tasks of the Prime Minister will be examined so as to fully understand the duties of the Prime Minister of Canada. As well, an evaluation of the various leadership styles will follow such that one can separate the various styles of the leaders to be examined.

Chapter two will examine why the Prime Minister is consistently the focal point of government rather than the institutions themselves. It will be argued that there are four basic reasons for this; first, clearly the Prime Minister is

most visible. Second, the relationship between the formal and political executives is such that the Prime Minister is at the forefront. Third, the Prime Minister's role as party leader automatically places him in the most preeminent position. Fourth, the Prime Minister's supremacy over Cabinet ensures a degree of power that the other members do not possess. It will be noted within this chapter that despite the preeminence of the Prime Minister, his popularity is nonetheless temporary.

Chapter three will focus on the approaches to public support for leadership. The first segment will focus specifically on leadership images to examine just how important a positive image is. The second segment will analyze some of the popular literature on public support to analyze plausible explanations for the eroding popularity of leaders in Canada.

Chapter four will focus on Prime Ministers Mulroney and Trudeau. Through the use of survey data from the 1984 and 1988 election studies and Gallup poll data, the change over time in the popularity of both men will be examined. Trudeau and Mulroney will also be compared with other respective party leaders of the time. Each individual will be assessed on his ability to govern well, and also on his relationship with the media. Public perception toward the leaders will be clear on the basis of answers to questions involving the personal characteristics of the leaders. Through a comparative analysis, a broader picture of whether or not the leader in

question is being judged harshly by the public will emerge.

Chapter five will focus on the media and its role in formulating public perception. Though it will become clear throughout this study that there are various explanations to account for the eroding popularity of leaders in this country, the media will be considered the most plausible explanation.

Let us begin by searching for an appropriate definition for political leadership from which to base this study upon.

CHAPTER ONE:TOWARD A DEFINITION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP**Introduction**

An extensive analysis of political leadership should begin with a simple definition of precisely what political leadership is. The trouble is that no clear and widely agreed upon definition exists. Leadership is conceived of as a power relation, or as a form of influence or persuasion; as a function of a group process, or as a function of individual personality. [Kellerman 1986: 2] Sometimes leadership is associated with a formal position in an organized system; at others with an informal relationship between the individuals who make things happen and those who lend them implicit or explicit support.

An anthology of articles on political leadership published in 1972, was subtitled "Readings for an Emerging Field," and the editor, in a subsequent volume of his own on this subject, summed up the status of political leadership as follows: "Past neglect. Present emergence. Future potential." Now, he went on, "we need to ask, what is meant by political leadership?" [Paige 1972:3] He thereby called attention to the fact that leadership is an elusive phenomenon and that there is no consensus among political scientists on what it means. Others have stressed the same point. "The precise nature of

political leadership is one of the most difficult problems in the domain of politics, or indeed in social action, yet it is one of the most real phenomena in political and social behaviour," wrote the eminent Chicago political scientist Charles E. Merriam in 1945. [Tucker 198:27] "Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth," wrote James MacGregor Burns thirty-three years later. [Burns 1978:16] Despite Burns' frustration with leadership he has provided one of the most widely cited definitions of leadership:

Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to realize goals mutually held by both leaders and followers. [Burns 1978: 17]

For the purposes of this work, leadership will be viewed as an active, ongoing, developing relationship with others rather than an attribute one possesses at birth. While leadership can be exercised in a variety of settings, this author is concerned solely with political leadership in a governmental context. To be even more specific only the Canadian political system will be analyzed such that the Prime Minister will be the sole focus of this assessment on political leadership.

It would seem, at first glance, that within Canadian politics all roads lead to the Prime Minister and the

provincial premiers. Indeed, our leaders are so much a part of our consciousness that terms like Trudeaumania or the Diefenbaker years are typical catch phrases in Canadian society. One can safely assume then, that Prime Ministers by the very nature of their role are surrounded by much attention and inquiry. Canadian leaders have seldom been graced by the aura of greatness that is conferred on leaders in other countries. Clinton Rossiter, for instance, has described the myth of presidential greatness accepted by many Americans, especially up until Watergate:

Lincoln is the supreme myth, the richest symbol in the American experience. He is, as someone has remarked neither irreverently or sacrilegously, the martyred Christ of democracy's passion play. And who, then, can measure the strength that is given to the President because he holds Lincoln's office, lives in Lincoln's house, and walks in Lincoln's way? The final greatness of the Presidency lies in the truth that it is not just an office of incredible power but a breeding ground of indestructible myth. [Cronin 1980:81]

Indeed, it can be argued that Canada's internal divisions, its complex federal system and the constant need for compromise have mitigated against the emergence of "heroes". Canadians, for the most part, have tended to be highly critical of their leaders. Gaile McGregor has argued that Canadians not only expect but have even come to admire evasion, scheming, and "magical" tricks from their leaders. [McGregor 1985: 29]

Bearing all of this in mind, it is the intent of this undertaking to address the issue of public perception. By doing so, it will come to the fore why the Prime Minister is

the most salient and visible symbol of government. In keeping with this, then, it should come as no surprise that he commands the attention he does. What is surprising, however, is that few leaders are able to maintain a strong popularity for any length of time in this country. Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke attribute this fact to partisanship and the state of the economy. One plausible explanation they overlook which is central to this study is the media. An analysis of the effects of the media on the popularity of leaders will follow later in this study. It is crucial now to analyze the history of political leadership so that the evolution of the relationship between the people and the leader can come to the fore.

Max Weber pointed the way early in this century. In his essay on "Politics as a Vocation" [1918] he defined politics as the "leadership, or the influencing of the leadership of a political association, hence, today, of a state," and added that by a "state" he meant a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. [Mughan and Patterson 1991: 5] Politics, then, as a discipline became the study of "authority" defined as legitimized domination in various forms. [Mughan and Patterson 1991: 5] However, no systematic account of leadership emerged.

It is in the recent history of political science that one can see the beginning of conscious efforts in this direction.

James MacGregor Burns, the author of a major attempt at analyzing political leadership, formulates his thoughts as a confession:

As a political scientist I have belonged to a "power school" that analyzed the interrelationships of persons on the basis only of power. Perhaps this was fitting for two world wars and revolutions, the unleashing of the inhuman force of the atom. I fear, however, that we are paying a steep intellectual and political price for our preoccupation with power. Viewing politics as power has blinded us to the crucial role of power in politics and hence to the pivotal role of leadership. [Burns 1978: 22]

Max Weber in his treatise on leadership authority starts from the argument that all political leaders seek to legitimize their authority in the eyes of the governed, Weber identifies three types of leadership authority that are distinguished by the source of their legitimacy. These are the charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. [Weber 1958: 4] Charismatic authority is assumed by those who possess extraordinary gifts. [Weber 1958: 4] Obedience comes from a sense of awe inspired by those who seem to have special grace or even magical powers. Traditional authority is quite different. Traditional leaders inherit their position as a birthright. [Weber 1958: 4] They symbolize to their followers a historic chain of authority and allegiance. Monarchy is the clearest form of traditional leadership. Rational-legal authority, on the other hand, is based on bureaucratic or technical expertise and on rational impersonal processes. [Weber 1958: 5] The bond of obedience comes from a respect for

law and the obligations of citizenship. According to Weber, charismatic leaders introduce new values and create new institutions, traditional leaders uphold the status quo, and those vested with legal authority can, if they want, introduce incremental change. [Weber 1958: 6]

Later in this study an assessment of leadership styles will be conducted. Charismatic leadership will be dealt with in greater depth at that time.

Leadership as a Relational Phenomenon

To many, leadership cannot inhere in individuals because it is a relational phenomenon. This theory proposes that leaders cannot exist in the absence of followers and the demand for leadership varies with the situation. In other words, leadership is a pattern involving three essential components: leader, followers, and the functional relationship between leaders and followers. [Mughan and Patterson 1991: 8] It is a function of both the social situation and personality, and of these two in interaction. C.A. Gibb argues in Leadership that there are several aspects surrounding the relationship between leaders and followers. He believes, in agreement with Mughan and Patterson, that indeed the personality of the leader is a very important component in the leader/follower relationship. That is, if you have a leader who is deemed good natured and down to earth, his followers should see this and be impressed by it.

The relational phenomenon, then, is the dominant theory of leadership, covering all instances of leadership in principle. It is the relational theory that will be adopted for this study as it illustrates just how important the relationship between leaders and followers actually is. Since this work is examining public perception of leaders, it seems only fitting to adopt a theory that addresses the whole relationship concept. It is important now to apply this theory to the Canadian government context.

Canada inherits from Great Britain a cabinet system of government. The Cabinet symbolizes collective authority and fuses party, politics, and government. Prime Ministers in Cabinet-style systems are expected to serve long apprenticeships in their political parties and in Parliament. For instance, British Prime Ministers serve an average of over a quarter of a century in Parliament before assuming the highest office. In the classic formulation, the Prime Minister is "first among equals" at the Cabinet table.

Prime-Ministerial Life Cycle

To become Prime Minister of Canada, one must go through what R.M. Punnett has termed the prime-ministerial life cycle. Essentially, Punnett argues that there are four stages involved in achieving and maintaining the role of Prime Minister. [Punnett 1977: 19] The first stage is entitled "Acquiring the Post," a process which involves three steps. [Punnett 1977: 19] The aspiring Prime Minister must first of

all become party leader. [Punnett 1977: 19] Clearly, the particular skills for this task will vary with the method of selection that the party uses, be it selection by an elite group, by caucus, or by a convention that is open to the various contenders of the party. The main Canadian parties now use Conventions to select their leaders, and success at a convention requires the ability to attract the support of grass-roots delegates drawn from across Canada. For this the aspiring Prime Minister requires the skills of the faction leader, so that he² may pose convincingly as the embodiment of party interests.[Punnett 1977: 20] Having become party leader, he has then to lead the party in a general election. In order to hold the post for any length of time, however, he has to be able to win elections. For this task, he is still a partisan figure, leading a political party, but he must also have the vote-catching skills to attract non-committed voters as well as the party faithful. [Punnett 1977: 20] Once the election has been won he has to move a stage further away from partisanship in order that he may exercise political and symbolic leadership over the nation as a whole. For this, one has to be able to pose as the symbol of national interests and aspirations. [Punnett 1977: 20]

The second stage in the cycle is the formation of a government.[Punnett 1977: 21] This involves the selection of

² Because Canadian Prime Ministers have, to date, been men, this paper does not utilize gender neutral terms.

ministers and of advisers for the Prime Minister's personal staff, and also the creation of an organizational structure in which they can operate. For the selection of personnel, the Prime Minister requires the skills of the recruiting officer. [Punnett 1977: 21] One has to be able to find the right people, and then persuade them to serve together under him in the posts he wishes them to fill.

The Prime Minister inherits from his predecessor an on-going structure, and one is free to adapt it or leave it unchanged. At the macro-level of basic constitutional machinery, few changes have been made since Confederation, and the Canadian Constitution remains monarchical, federal, and parliamentary. At the micro-level, however, matters have been much more fluid, with Prime Ministers making several changes over the years in matters such as the size of the Cabinet, the number and functions of its committees, the number of departments, and the size and functions of the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office. [Punnett 1977: 21]

Having formed a government the Prime Minister then has to ensure that it operates effectively - which brings us to the third stage. Leading the government involves preserving its unity, controlling its output, and on many occasions, representing it in negotiations with other governments at home and abroad. The most basic requirement is for the Prime Minister to hold his team together. This task requires the

personnel officer's skills of man-management. [Punnett 1977: 22] One must be able to settle differences of opinion that emerge among ministers, either by persuading dissenters to accept the majority view, or if it becomes necessary, to dismiss, with the minimum of fuss, those who are undermining unity. If the Prime Minister picks his team carefully in the beginning, and conciliates effectively when conflicts do emerge, dramatic dismissals become unnecessary.

In order to exert control over the government's output (by which is meant executive actions, moral leadership, foreign policy initiatives, as well as legislation), the Prime Minister can adopt one of two approaches. [Punnett 1977: 22] On the one hand, he can act as a "chairman of the board," using the skills of the arbitrator to coax a consensus from conflicting points of view in Cabinet, and persuade dissenters to accept the dominant view and live within collective responsibility. Alternatively, one can act as a more dynamic "managing director," using the skills of the innovator to devise solutions to problems, and then impose initiatives upon one's ministerial colleagues. [Punnett 1977: 22] For the "chairman of the board" approach Punnett argues that the Prime Minister has to be somewhat self-effacing, subordinating his own view to the collective view. For the "managing director" approach he has to have the personal prestige, talent, and strength of will to enable him to dominate colleagues. [Punnett 1977: 22] A Prime Minister will adopt each of these

approaches at one time or another. Inevitably, however, one will incline more towards one than the other, depending on one's own character and personality, prestige with the public and with ministers, the abilities and status of these ministers, and the variety of opinions that exist among them, which in turn will be dependent upon the way the Prime Minister has performed his earlier role of recruiting officer.

Punnett entitles the fourth stage of the cycle, the "selling" stage. He argues that a basic principle of democratic politics, as of law, is that not only must justice be done, it must be seen to be done.[Punnett 1977: 23] More than this, even when justice is not done political leaders must try to make it appear as if it is done. Governments ignore the art of public relations at their peril. As much as anything, the politician's task is to explain and persuade - to explain to the electorate what the government is doing, and to persuade them to accept it. In Canada the Prime Minister is the principal person to whom the public looks for the explanation and justification of government outputs. Inevitably, therefore, the Prime Minister becomes the government's chief public-relations officer. For this role, one must be skilled in public pleading, capable of presenting a case in terms that will be understood by, and will capture the imagination of his audience. It must be noted, however, that the "audience" can be any one of the five "p's" - Parliament, party, pressure groups, press, and public. The

form of the appeal that one will have to make, and the particular public relations skills a potential Prime Minister will require, will be different in each case. He will be able to adopt a blatantly partisan stance when facing party or pressure group leaders in private, but when facing Parliament, the press or the public one will have to talk more in terms of the broader national interest.

The fifth and final stage of Punnett's cycle is termed "retaining the post". [Punnett 1985: 23] According to Punnett, the process of retaining the position of Prime Minister brings one back to the beginning of the cycle - although to square two rather than to square one, in that he does not have to secure re-adoption as party leader.

The Prime Minister does have to fight a general election, however, at least every five years. It is clear, however, that a Prime Minister cannot afford to assume that a well-fought two-month campaign will remedy the neglect of public relations over the preceding four years. Prime Ministers have to guard their government's reputations throughout a Parliament.

The basic electoral strategy involved in seeking to retain power is essentially the same as that involved in attempting to gain office from Opposition. In each case it is necessary to capture the votes of non-committed electors while retaining the support of the party faithful. The task of defending a record, however, requires different tactics from

that of attacking a record, and often the most profitable tactic is to divert public attention onto other matters, such as the personal qualities of the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition.

Tasks of the Prime Minister

The job requirements of the Prime Minister can be seen quite apart from the skills needed in understanding and transcending the different systems and subgovernments that are described earlier in this work. There is, however, a large body of scholarly work on almost every aspect of the U.S. president's responsibilities. One of the most interesting descriptions appears in The State of the Presidency by Thomas Cronin, in which standards have been identified that could apply just as readily to Canadian Prime Ministers and premiers. The seven activity areas described by Cronin are:

1. Crisis Management
2. Symbolic or Morale-Building Leadership
3. Priority Setting and Program Design
4. Recruitment Leadership
5. Legislative and Political Coalition Building
6. Program Implementation and Evaluation
7. Oversight of Government Routines and Establishment of an Early-Warning System for Future Problem Areas

While one could argue that Canadian Prime Ministers and premiers do not have to face crises such as those faced by an American president, on the scale of a Cuban missile crisis or a Vietnam War, Canada has had its share of wars and no shortage of internal crises. Canadian office-holders should be

judged on whether they have inspired, given purpose and boosted morale. Leaders should also symbolize societal values and stand for principles that are cherished in the political system. One can argue that most leaders are "screened" with this in mind, so that holding these values is in fact a prerequisite for leadership. In other words, the electorate should realize and internalize the kind of leader this particular individual would make and judge accordingly. It would appear, however, that this is not always the case. In fact, more often than not, Canadians judge harshly after the leader comes to power rather than before. This statement, albeit strong, will become evident throughout this work.

The job, as Cronin put it, is to "clarify many of the major issues of the day, define what is possible, and harness the governmental structure so that new initiatives are possible." [Taras and Weyant: 12] A fourth measure is the ability to attract the most able person available to government. A large number of appointments are made at the discretion of first ministers. These include more than Cabinet and judicial positions but appointments to a number of agencies, boards and commissions as well. In an oft cited example, Lester Pearson was able to save a deteriorating political situation by recruiting the so-called three wise men; Gerard Pelletier, Jean Marchand, and Pierre Trudeau, into the Liberal Party in 1965. [Taras and Weyant: 13] This move not only shored up Liberal fortunes in Quebec in the short

term, but altered the political balances in that province in the long run.

The fifth criterion is the building of a broad governing coalition.[Taras and Weyant: 13] In a minority government, Prime Ministers and premiers must strike deals with the opposition and find votes wherever they can in order to maintain power. Broadly based support in the regions, among political interests and in both linguistic communities, is necessary if a Prime Minister is to move decisively on important national questions. The forging of consensus is especially critical in Canada, where feelings of alienation from Ottawa can have dangerous consequences. Another important criterion of leadership is the energy to ensure that policies are implemented correctly and that the effects of policy changes are evaluated accurately. Office-holders often encounter bureaucratic resistance to their programs for change. Non-compliance, stalling, and poor communication of directives occur far too often so that many times the leader in question is impeded by forces both within and outside the political system.

The last task outlined by Cronin is the monitoring of the government's basic structures and routines and scanning the horizon for new developments, prospects, and threats to the operations of the government. [Taras and Weyant: 14] One might expand on Cronin's idea by arguing that Prime Ministers and premiers should anticipate change, not only in the government,

but in society as a whole. Cronin's description stresses that leaders must ensure that the engine of government, and each part of the overall machine, functions smoothly.

Having discussed how to become Prime Minister and the tasks involved once one has achieved the title, it is now beneficial to examine leadership styles. Bearing in mind that each individual has his own style, it should be noted that this paper's intention is certainly not to typecast people, rather it is to discover what kind of people become leaders and the different styles they adopt upon achieving the title Prime Minister of Canada.

Leadership Styles

Stanley Hoffman has argued that essentially there are only two styles of leaders; the heroic and the routine. [Pal 1988: 9] Different terms have been used in different contexts to describe approximately the same phenomenon. For example, psychologist Abraham Zaleznik described leaders as having either a charismatic or a consensus style. [Pal 1988: 9] In his 1938 book on power, Bertrand Russell contrasted what he called "soldiers of fortune" with those he described as "believers in a cause." [Pal 1988: 10] The former were driven by ambition and opportunism, while the latter were often individuals of profound religious faith who regarded themselves as instruments of extra-human purposes. Hoffman's characterization is perhaps the most applicable to the purpose of this work, since his focus is on heads of government.

Hoffman used as his model of heroic leadership the dynamic leaders of modern France; Marechal Petain, Pierre Mendes France and Charles de Gaulle. The heroic leader arrives from outside normal organizational or political life to rescue the nation in crisis or save a political regime from collapse. [Pal 1988: 10] Above all, the individual places his wishes after the wishes of the nation. The heroic figure is shrouded in mystery and conveys a distant magnetic power.

Routine leaders differ from heroic leaders in almost every way. They have risen to positions of power because of their mastery of party and bureaucracy and are the products of organizational life. [Pal 1988: 11] Hoffman states that "smoothness, unobtrusiveness, procedural self-effacing skill, flexibility, a somewhat subdued brand of cleverness, these are the functional requirements of a routine style." [Pal 1988: 11]

One can argue that setting up polar opposites is a kind of strait-jacket. The danger is that these black and white archetypes do not capture the numerous shades of grey the lie in between. Yet, if one was to apply Hoffman's descriptions to Canadian political life, an obvious conclusion would be that Prime Ministers have been, for the most part, leaders of routine. As Robert Craig Brown has observed about Canada's Prime Ministers, particularly before the Second World War:

the prescription for success was a restrained approach to partisanship and a wary attitude towards innovation. Sir John A. Creighton observed, "was not

a crusader with a mission; he thumped no tubs and banged no pulpits." Similarly, Laurier as Skelton put it, "was never a man to raise questions before they were ripe." And King, the master of the "half-measure," saw no need for political action when political harmony did not seem threatened. [Pal 1988: 10]

Lester B. Pearson has written: "No strong man in the emotionally satisfying sense has ever ruled this country - none will if it is to survive". [Pal 1988: 10] Attempting to reconcile what appears to be the irreconcilable will continue to be the task of Prime Ministers and in this task Prime Ministers tend to look uninspiring. Yet there have been Canadian leaders who seem closer to the heroic, "outsider" type than to routine politicians: John Diefenbaker, Rene Levesque, Joey Smallwood and Pierre Trudeau. They were powerful speakers, thrived on drama, cherished versions of Canada's or their province's destiny, and possessed unshakeable confidence in the correctness of their ideas. One can argue that they came to power as a result of some measure of dissatisfaction with old ways or old regimes and that each had to face "emergencies" of some kind, even if in some instances these emergencies were self-imposed. Although the fit with Hoffman's heroic leader may not be exact, these men cannot be described as routine.

One is tempted to argue that success in the Canadian political system is most readily achieved by a conciliatory style, and that heroes have not done particularly well in terms of concrete achievements, whatever glamour and panache

they might bring to the process. As Margaret Atwood has written about heroic figures in a different context: "Prophets don't get very far against the civil service." [Pal 1988; 11] One may suspect that there still is in Canada a discernible longing for the "hero in history". It may come from the traditional view of Western culture that leaders should be competitive and aggressive and ultimately conquerors. To characterize Joe Clark as a "wimp," regardless of how competent he may be, is to label him unfit for the Prime Ministership. Mackenzie King and Lester Pearson, among others, were also ridiculed because of their innate caution and conciliatory style. In a presidential address to the American Psychological Association, Kenneth B. Clarke has argued that it is wrong to use "macho" concepts of leadership as the standard to which leaders must measure up. [Pal 1988; 12] These qualities can do serious harm to tenuous economic and political arrangements and are also immensely dangerous.

Having assessed Hoffman's analysis of leadership styles, it is fitting to return to a subject only touched on previously and what for some may be the most important characteristic of a particular leadership style; charisma. The concept of charisma has fertilized the study of leadership. Its very ambiguity has enabled it to be captured by scholars in different disciplines and applied to a variety of situations. The term itself means divine grace, but Weber did not make clear whether this gift of grace was a quality

possessed by leaders independent of society or a quality dependent on its recognition by followers. The term has taken on a number of different but overlapping meanings: leader's magical qualities; an emotional bond between leader and led; dependence on a father figure by the masses; popular assumptions that a leader is powerful, omniscient, and virtuous; and simply imputation of enormous supernatural power to leaders. The word has been so overburdened as to collapse under close analysis.

Many have questioned the utility of the concept. Ann Ruth Willner argues that charisma does not reside in people or somewhere in their personalities. [Willner 1968: 19] She purports that it is wrong to assume some rare individuals naturally have charisma while most lack it. [Willner 1968: 19] It can be argued that it is not necessarily what the leader does but how he/she is perceived by followers that is decisive for the validity of charisma. After all, one must be aware that leadership is a relational phenomenon, involving the interaction of leader and followers toward goals and within the context of situations.

Let us take charisma and apply it in the Canadian context. Many have argued that P.E. Trudeau is a charismatic individual. Insofar as charisma can be seen as a quality of an individual, it lies in Trudeau's capacity to project successfully an image of himself as an extraordinary leader. Certainly, what Trudeau, and any other leader, is and does

helps to shape follower reactions. Moreover, crucial to their responses to his call is what the public feels about him. Essentially, then, it comes down to image - the image one projects is fundamental if one chooses to retain the Prime Ministership. Some leaders are simply better at projecting a convincing image and as a result are typically more inclined to be accepted longer by the masses.

Certainly, it takes far more than a strong image to become a successful Prime Minister. Someone who cannot pose convincingly as a champion of party interests is unlikely to reach even the first base of becoming party leader. Even though Trudeau was relatively new to the Liberal Party in 1968, he had shown himself capable of defending Quebec Liberal interests. Walter Gordon, on the other hand, who might have aspired to the leadership of the Liberal Party, had difficulty in convincing large sections of the party that he was ideologically acceptable to them. If the party leader is unconvincing as a vote-catcher, he/she will not be able to achieve office, unless the collective appeal exerted by the party is sufficiently strong to overcome personal deficiencies. Mackenzie King was a master electioneer, and this gave him a vast hold over his party. [Punnett 1977: 127] Meighen, on the other hand, no matter how many other prime-ministerial qualities he possessed, lacked the fundamental skill of being able to win elections. Again, even though a party leader may persuade a majority of electors to support

him, if after the election, he fails to convince the other parties' supporters that he is a truly national leader, he will preside over a divided country.

If a Prime Minister cannot adapt the machinery of government so as to produce effective policy-making and decision-taking procedures, his government will become inefficient. If a Prime Minister cannot persuade people of ability and influence to serve as ministers he will produce a team that is untalented and unrepresentative, or both. Sir John A. Macdonald, in forming his first Cabinet, set the pattern of a regionally and ethnically representative team, and throughout his reign as Prime Minister he successfully balanced interests and talent in his Cabinet.

Once the team is built, if the Prime Minister is unskilled in personnel-management, he will not be able to hold it together. If a Prime Minister cannot move his Cabinet, either by imposing his own wishes on colleagues, or by producing a consensus through arbitration, the government's output will be poor, and confined to non-controversial issues. R.B. Bennett is perhaps the prime example of the "managing director" type of Prime Minister who pushed his Cabinet in directions he determined, while Lester Pearson was the "chairman of the board" who constantly sought consensus on which to base decisions. [Punnett 1977: 27] John Diefenbaker, on the other hand, has been accused of carrying the search for consensus to the extreme, and of being prepared to take action

only when there was virtual unanimity in Cabinet. [Punnett 1977: 27] No matter how successful a Prime Minister may be in the domestic arena, if he lacks the skills of the international diplomat, and is out of his depth at head-of-state meetings, essential Canadian interests will suffer.

Thus, the skills that the Prime Minister is required to possess are so numerous and so varied that it is, as Punnett argues, almost inevitable he will be lacking in one of them. [Punnett 1977: 27]. Thomas Jefferson's pessimistic judgement that "no man will ever bring out of the Presidency the reputation which carries him into it" applies equally well to the office of the Prime Minister. As R.M. Punnett states:

There may be something of an iron law of unavoidable prime-ministerial failure: every Prime Minister will have an Achilles heel on which critics can focus, so that no matter how successful he may be in most aspects of his job, his reputation is liable to be undermined by his lack of even one of the necessary talents. [Punnett 1977: 28]

Conclusion

Having examined leadership within a theoretical framework and applied this framework to the role of the Prime Minister of Canada, one can draw a couple of conclusions. First, the road to the Prime Ministership is both long and winding such that one is required to possess a whole host of skills to get there and even more to stay there. Second, Canadian Prime Ministers survive and enjoy power only so long as they succeed

in accommodating those with whom they are obliged to deal. A Canadian Prime Minister's position is not that of a medieval monarch secure in a hereditary right to rule, not that of a modern military dictator preserved in office by force of arms, nor that of a political-religious leader sustained by the devotion of his flock. [Punnett 1977: 160] The Prime Minister's position is not even that of an American President who knows that, short of assassination, or a once-in-a-century upheaval such as that which led to the resignation of Richard Nixon, he can retain office from one election to the next. Rather, the Prime Minister's position faces threats of constant rebellion and dissatisfaction. Clearly, his position is considerably less secure than that of the American President. Finally, and this point is closely related to the previous one, the Prime Minister of Canada must never lose sight of the paramount necessity of retaining the confidence of the House and beyond the House, of the electorate. No matter how lofty his position, he can always be defeated and displaced and in the end, the exercise of prime-ministerial power lies in the art of living within the considerable constraints that are imposed by the realities of political life. Realizing this fact, it is now important to analyze the political institutions so as to discern why the Prime Minister's position is so preeminent.

CHAPTER TWO:PRIME MINISTERS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE PREEMINENCY OF CANADIAN PRIME MINISTERS**INTRODUCTION**

As has been clearly demonstrated, Canadians have quite a passionate interest in the Prime Minister. The political institutions, in comparison, receive very little attention. The intent of this chapter is to discern why this is so. In other words, it is important to understand why the Prime Minister is the most visible and salient symbol of government. Clearly, the political institutions do not command the attention by the media, hence the public, that the Prime Minister does. As will be demonstrated throughout the remainder of this study, despite his preeminence the Prime Minister enjoys very brief popularity. Before doing so, it is necessary to define what will, for the purposes of this study, be considered a political institution.

In most contemporary theories of political institutions, traditional political institutions such as the legislature, the legal system, and the state, as well as traditional economic institutions, such as the firm, have receded in importance from the position they held in earlier theories of political science. From a behavioral point of view, formally organized political institutions have come to be portrayed

simply as arenas within which political behaviour, driven by more fundamental factors, occurs. From a normative point of view, ideas that embedded morality in institutions, such as law or bureaucracy, and that emphasized citizenship and community as foundations of political identity, have given way to ideas of moral individualism and an emphasis on bargaining among conflicting interests.

Accepting all of this, then, James March and John Olson provides us with a solid definition of what, for the purposes of this work, will be considered a political institution. According to March and Olson in Rediscovering Institutions, political institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. Through rules and a logic of appropriateness, political institutions realize both order, stability, and predictability, on the one hand, and flexibility and adaptiveness, on the other. [March and Olson 1989: 160]

Political institutions have been described and analyzed in terms of perspectives as varied as that of a formal, legal style concentrating on constitutions, laws and rules, of a purely descriptive style focusing on the origins and developments of specific institutions, of a tradition portraying political institutions as arenas for charismatic leaders, and of a realpolitik style emphasizing political institutions as arenas for rival, external groups with

different resources and interests. [March and Olson 1987: 159]

Within the confines of this work, political institutions will be viewed moreso as arenas for leaders than anything else. That is not to say that this aspect of political institutions is more important. Rather, as we have seen, political institutions includes various features and no one angle is any more important than the next. However, for the intent of this work certainly said approach is more relevant as specific attention will be focused on both the executive and legislative institutions of government.

The characteristics of a parliamentary executive include first and foremost its dual structure- both a formal and a political executive; second, its relationship with the legislature, which is based on the fusion of powers principle; and third, its term in office, which is variable within a maximum time limit.[Landes 1987: 93] The formal executive, that is the monarchical element with the Queen at the apex and the Governor General and lieutenant governors acting on her behalf, performs primarily symbolic and ceremonial functions for the polity.

The political executive, unlike the formal, occupies centre stage in the struggle for policy, power, and patronage.[Landes 1987:99] The public visibility of the formal and political executive reveals much about their extensive influence in the Canadian political process. While the role of the formal executive is poorly understood or, for that matter,

scarcely recognized, that of the political executive is the focus of much public attention. For example, while the Queen is recognized by most Canadians, her representatives seem to have made a very minor impression on the ordinary citizen.

The dominant role of the political executive is primarily a consequence of custom and convention, rather than a result of legal prescription.[Putnam 1976: 23] The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are not mentioned in the 1867 Constitution Act, although the Prime Minister is named in other statutes.[Landes 1987: 100] As was previously stated, the evolution and development of the Prime Minister's tasks reflect an important mechanism of adaptation by the political system to a changing environment. Moreover, to a considerable extent, the role of the Prime Minister depends on the individual who occupies the office.

Although Canada's political system culminates in this one man, and the arsenal of his authority is indeed huge, both the basis and the boundaries of that authority are ill-defined... What the Prime Minister of Canada is not is established by legislative checks and the circumscribing realities of Canadian politics. What he is depends on him. The office is reconfigured by its occupant.
[Newman 1973: 80-81]

Given such a context, the Prime Minister has come to be the key political actor of Canadian politics by combining political resources and skills with a political will so as to provide leadership on major questions of public policy.[Weller

1985: 35] Various factors contribute to the preeminence of the Prime Minister. Reference has always been made to the emphasis given to his position as a result of the representation principle, but there are other important factors as well. The Prime Minister's relationship with the public, his role as party leader and master of his Cabinet, his influence over policy making, his special relationship with the Crown, and the Prime Minister's own style and personality are all important in this regard. [Matheson 1976: 127] With respect to the ordinary citizen, the Prime Minister, as was demonstrated, is clearly the most visible and salient symbol of political leadership in the country. Clearly, it is no coincidence that the growth of Prime Ministerial influence has accelerated in the past few decades at the same time that television has become the main political medium. Undoubtedly, the public do not view political institutions in the same manner as they view their leader. One obvious reason for this is the simple fact that the media concentrates far more on the Prime Minister than the political institutions since he is the most salient and visible symbol of government and since it is easier to concentrate on one individual as opposed to a vast institution.

THE PRIME MINISTER AS PARTY LEADER

According to W. A. Matheson, the Prime Minister is master of his party. [Matheson 1976: 127] He has been elected

party leader via a national party convention, and as long as he can keep members of the party convinced that he will retain office and win elections, his power is overwhelming.[Matheson 1976: 128] If a Prime Minister is in a strong position insofar as the electorate is concerned, it is highly unlikely that the party will be anxious to replace him. Moreover, as party leader the Prime Minister has control over the party organization.

In the past he has appointed leading party officials, including organizers, and thus controls, or is in a position to control, party strategy.[Courtney 1973: 34] He is akin to a general in command of an army; his power is almost absolute within the party. He alone authoritatively expresses the views of the party, and every aspect of its platform requires his approval.

As party leader, the Prime Minister can claim that he owes his position to the grass roots of the party, not to the parliamentary caucus or to the Cabinet, because he has been elected via a leadership convention.[Matheson 1976:129] He can claim also that he has received a mandate from the party, a claim that is especially useful in times of conflict with caucus or Cabinet, for no one else can make that claim. Since the numerous cleavages in Canadian society prevent the polarization of political parties around issues, the political struggle tends to revolve around the personalities of the party leaders rather than around questions of alternative

choices of action. Thus elections have more and more become personality contests, enabling a Prime Minister to claim that his support comes from the public who voted for him rather than for any particular policy or program. It can even be argued that under the present system the only mandate a Member of Parliament has to follow is to follow the leader, since the party's policy is the policy of the leader.

For the most part, a Prime Minister, as a result of his control over the party, can be sure that his party's backbenchers will support him and the Cabinet in the House, and in public, however much they may oppose him in caucus. [Pal 1988: 89]

THE PRIME MINISTER AS MASTER OF HIS CABINET

The Prime Minister derives great power from his mastery over the Cabinet. "He has in his gift the highest executive offices in the state, and although he is limited, by custom and convention in his distribution of them, his problem is not usually one of persuading men to accept Cabinet appointments, but of choosing among the aspirants." [Gibson 1970: 174] His power to appoint and dismiss Cabinet members and to allocate portfolios gives him a very decisive influence over the political futures of his colleagues, since he is able to encourage the careers of some and impede the careers of others.

Certainly, the Prime Minister does not have absolute

power in appointing ministers. Furthermore, he is limited in his ability to dismiss ministers, although constitutionally his right cannot be disputed.[Courtney 1973: 36] The normal course of events is for Cabinet ministers to resign when they cannot get their own way on policy, rather than for the Prime Minister to dismiss a minister in order to get his way. The possible political consequences make it a very unwise procedure to dismiss a Cabinet minister who has high standing in the party or who represents an important segment of Canadian society.[Matheson 1976:134] It can be argued, then, that the Prime Minister's ability to appoint and dismiss ministers can be exaggerated; political reality limits him severely.

It should be noted, however, that after the 1974 federal election, Trudeau asked three of his ministers to resign, apparently because their performance had not lived up to his expectations. One of these was the minister from New Brunswick and another was the sole Jewish member of the Cabinet.[Gwyn 1980:99] They were both immediately replaced by another member from New Brunswick and a second Jewish member so that the representation principle was not impaired.[Gwyn 1980:99] The fact that there was no great public outcry over these resignations may be a manifestation of the deference of the groups represented by these particular ministers. Nevertheless, calling for resignations on the basis of dissatisfaction with performance is a rare event in Cabinet

government in Canada.

The Prime Minister does have a free hand in managing the operations of the Cabinet. He controls the agenda through the Privy Council Office and thus can decide what is to be discussed - and possibly more important he can decide what will not be discussed. During Cabinet meetings he acts as chairman and is thus in a position to guide the discussion along the lines he wishes.[Pal 1988: 89] He can also terminate discussions and assess the feelings of the Cabinet. The last word is always his. Mr.Diefenbaker remarked, "The Prime Minister must always have the last and decisive word." [Newman 1973:107] A minister who disagrees with the Prime Minister, then, is in a very difficult position. His choice is a very simple one: he can resign or he can accept the Prime Minister's view. The fact that there have been very few resignations from the Canadian Cabinet over matters of policy indicates quite clearly the decision most ministers have taken.[Matheson 1976: 130]

The consequences of a minister's resignation are extremely serious in terms of his political career. If he resigns, he risks losing the favour of the party and will probably have difficulty in securing the party's nomination at the next election, although it is quite possible that a minister who has forfeited his chance for advancement by resigning from the Cabinet would not be interested in attempting to be re-elected. Clearly, if a minister resigns

from Cabinet over a policy disagreement with the Prime Minister, from that point on he can anticipate a bleak political career.[Punnett 1977: 106] The doctrine of Cabinet solidarity has the effect of muzzling the Prime Minister's opponents and thus his position is greatly enhanced.[Matheson 1976: 130]

It should be noted, however, that again there are realistic limitations to the power of the Prime Minister. In many instances Cabinet ministers are powerful in their own right either because of their personal ability or because of the interests they represent. There is no doubt however that the Prime Minister as chairman of the Cabinet and as chairman of the chief co-ordinating committee, the Prime Minister's Office, has a great advantage over other ministers. In many instances, he is better informed on a wide range of issues than his ministers and this in itself is sufficient to make him the most powerful and preeminent minister in the Cabinet.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND POLICY FORMATION

When Pierre Trudeau came to power in 1968 the power of the Prime Minister over policy formation had been substantially increased. Trudeau initiated changes in the Privy Council Office, in the Prime Minister's Office, and in the Cabinet committee system.[Aucoin 1988:56] The centralization and co-ordination in the Privy Council Office

enables the Prime Minister to have access to information that is not easily available to his colleagues. Because extensive use is now made of cabinet committees and it is the Prime Minister who appoints the members of the committees, he may decide, through the Privy Council Office, what items of business go to a particular committee. Because through the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office, he is fully informed on developments taking place within Cabinet committees, he is certainly the best informed person in the Cabinet.[Matheson 1976:131]

It can be argued that since membership on Cabinet committees is closely related to the functional nature of the minister's department, the Prime Minister's ability even to select Cabinet committee members is restricted. The Ministers of External Affairs and National Defence can hardly be excluded from the Cabinet committee on External Affairs and Defence, the Minister of Finance could not be excluded from the Priorities and Planning committee, and the Minister of National Health and Welfare could not easily be left off of the Committee on Social Policy. The Prime Minister, however, still decides which portfolio will be assigned to a minister, and possibly he derives more power from this fact than from his ability to appoint and dismiss ministers, since it appears that there are fewer constraints on the Prime Minister's power to appoint to a particular portfolio than to appoint or dismiss.[Landes 1987: 105]

The Prime Minister can affect policy priorities for a government department by appointing as minister an individual who shares his ideas on what policy is desirable in that department, and he can transfer ministers whose policy he dislikes. It might be argued that the civil service, being a permanent and professional body, can counterbalance the influence of the Prime Minister over policy. It should be pointed out, however, that the Prime Minister has practically unlimited power to make appointments to his office, uninhibited by the usual restraints of the Public Service Commission or Treasury Board, and such appointees, because of their proximity to the Prime Minister, can frustrate the civil service's policy influence.

Again it is important to note that the Prime Minister's influence over policy can be exaggerated. The scope of governmental activity is so diverse and involves so many complex and technical details that it is impossible for one individual to master all of them. The point is that the position provides great potential for influence and pressure, and one would normally expect a Prime Minister to make extensive use of this potential.

It should be noted that the Prime Minister has a special role in the co-ordination of policy.[Landes 1987:106] He is the ultimate co-ordinator in the Cabinet and must decide disputes that cannot be resolved elsewhere. This requires him to maintain a delicate balancing act.[Matheson 1976: 131] He

must exercise general control but avoid undue interference; he must keep informed and avoid being accused of meddling with his minister's activities.[Fraser 1989: 112] One of the attributes of a successful Prime Minister, as was stated earlier, is the ability to maintain this balance.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CROWN

The Prime Minister also draws strength in the Cabinet from his special relationship with the Crown, since he is the only person who can advise the Governor General to dissolve Parliament and call an election.[Landes 1987: 100] It is unlikely that this is a very effective weapon when there is a quarrel in the Cabinet, because using it implies a divided party and under such circumstances an election is not beneficial to the Prime Minister or to the party. Only in very exceptional circumstances would it be sensible for a Prime Minister to recommend or threaten to recommend a dissolution during a Cabinet crisis. The power to advise a dissolution can, however, be a power over the opposition, especially in a minority government.

The Prime Minister then is the leading figure in the Cabinet; the nature of the office provides him with so much power that he is, of necessity, dominant but by no means all-powerful. The extent to which he dominates his Cabinet, however, depends on how he chooses to use the potentialities of his office, on his own personality and temperament, on the

political situation in which he finds himself, and on the relationship he is able to establish with his Cabinet colleagues and caucus. [Matheson 1976:134] Thus the success of a Prime Minister in asserting his claim to leadership depends on his personal qualities and on his administrative and political skill.

If the Prime Minister then occupies so pre-eminent a role in the governing of Canada, it is important to examine the behaviour of the occupants of the office, specifically Trudeau and Mulroney as they are the consistent "cases" examined within this study, to see if any distinctive style of conduct can be noted, and if any relevant generalizations can be made regarding the way in which Prime Ministers have conducted themselves in office. Furthermore, by conducting a study into the leadership of both men, it will become even more clear just how pre-eminent a role the Prime Ministership is regardless of the different styles utilized.

THE PRE-EMINENCE OF TRUDEAU

In Peter Aucoin's article, "Trudeau's Rational Management vs. Mulroney's Brokerage Politics", he argues that Trudeau used a very rationalist approach to leadership. He supports his stance by using one of Trudeau's own statements which purports:

the state...will need political instruments which are sharper, stronger and more finely controlled than anything based on mere emotionalism. Such tools will be made up of

advanced technology and scientific investigation, as applied to the fields of law, economics, social psychology, international affairs and other areas of human relations; in short, if not a pure product of reason, the political tools of the future will be designed and appraised by more rational standards than anything we are currently using in Canada today. [Aucoin 1988:50]

As several observers have stressed at length, this was not mere rhetoric; Trudeau did believe that knowledge would become the basis for political power. As an elected politician in the late 1960's this may have made him unique among his peers, especially in Canadian politics at that time, but he stood for both a major tradition in Western political thought and a trend then current in international politics and international circles. [Aucoin 1988:50] In and of itself, however, Trudeau's functional rationalism would not perhaps have had as profound an influence on his role as Prime Minister if his personal style of leadership had not also placed great emphasis on the essentially liberal concept of the interplay of ideas in the practical realm of decision-making. [Aucoin 1988: 50]

According to Aucoin, Trudeau inherited from Pearson a system of Cabinet committees that enabled him to implement his paradigm of rational management without a great deal of structural alteration [Aucoin 1988: 51]. Yet his approach to the actual operations and processes of decision-making did require significant change. First and foremost, the committee system had to be managed with a great deal more discipline. This meant increased formalization and more rigid rules and

procedures.

Second, the Cabinet committee system also had to be transformed from an arrangement that merely facilitated the processing of an increased volume of Cabinet business to a forum for increased attention by ministers to policy planning across the entire span of governmental decision-making.

In short, the collegial character of Cabinet decision-making had to be enhanced. According to Aucoin, individual ministerial responsibility in the constitutional sense remained, insofar as the development and administration of departmental policies and programmes was concerned, but individual ministerial autonomy was to give way to an increased diffusion of power and authority among ministers collectively, the Cabinet and its system of committees.

Another important aspect of Trudeau's philosophy which led to his preeminence was his stress on the importance of counterweights. In the introduction to Federalism and the French Canadians he states:

The theory of checks and balances... has always had my full support. It translates into practical terms the concept of equilibrium that is inseparable from freedom in the realm of ideas. It incorporates a corrective for abuses and excesses into the very functioning of political institutions. My political action, or my theory - in so much as I can be said to have one - can be expressed very simply: create counterweights. [Trudeau 1968: 23]

Consequently the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's Office, and various commissions and boards have

acted to counterbalance the influence of the departmental bureaucracy. Inputs into the policy-making process are to be derived from a large number of sources, each acting as a counterweight to the other. Rational decision-making, however, seems to presuppose a set of values and priorities that is shared among the decision makers, yet there is no guarantee that the countervailing forces will have such values. They may simply react emotionally to a policy proposal or their reactions may be based on other values. [Matheson 1976: 169] Thus the final result may not actually arise out of purely rational calculation. There is also the possibility that decision makers faced with inputs from many sources may find themselves in a state of immobilism as a result of all the pressures on them. [Matheson 1976: 169] The establishment of a rational structure does not by itself guarantee the production of rational decisions and policies. Moreover, rationality may well have limited political value.

Such innovations by Trudeau provided him with more information and control over the policy-making process. This control undoubtedly placed him at the forefront of the decision-making process, a very powerful position indeed.

THE PREEMINENCE OF MULRONEY

According to Aucoin, Mulroney's leadership style differed extensively from Trudeau's. Mulroney's philosophy assumed that political leadership was about the accommodation of interests

and not the interplay of ideas. Whereas Trudeau was most concerned with the role of knowledge and analysis in the pursuit of comprehensive planning and rational decision-making, Mulroney had a much more political conception of ideal government, namely the pursuit of compromise among competing interests.[Aucoin 1988: 59]

Mulroney's preference was to deal with people one-on-one rather than on a collective basis. The logic here, of course, is that this transactional style facilitates compromise among differing points of view much more than does the collegial process, where the checks and balances lead more readily to stalemates if different points of view are strongly held. The contrast with Trudeau is again obvious. Mulroney's philosophy, in comparison to Trudeau's, assumes a greater degree of conflict over interests and thus implies a different priority to be given to their resolution.

This fact does not imply that Mulroney does not value a consensus among his colleagues. Indeed, as a strategy of management, consensus as an end in itself is given a high priority. In this sense, Aucoin states that Mulroney's style required that he be a leader of a "team" and, accordingly, that "people-management" be among his main concerns. As noted, however, the requirement does not demand collegial decision-making in the manner of Trudeau's leadership style.

Essentially in the first years in office, the Mulroney government could be characterized by one broad theme: an

increasing centralization of power and influence in the position of the Prime Minister and his staff in the Prime Minister's Office.[Aucoin 1988:60] More important than the size of the PMO were the additional political functions granted to it - the PMO became the nucleus of policy, patronage and power.[Landes 1987:100] As a result, the Privy Council Office, which had become the key player under Trudeau, suffered a decline in significance.

As was previously eluded, one result of this shifting balance between the PMO and PCO was a decline in the power of the Cabinet and the traditional departments. Key policy decisions were made in the PMO, not around the Cabinet table.[Landes 1987: 108] As a corollary of this new pattern, the power of the civil service, particularly of its senior mandarins, was reduced as well: "Under the Tories, power has shifted radically away from the senior bureaucrats and to the politicians, away from departments and to the Prime Minister's Office" [Little 1985: 32]

Clearly, then, the most significant trend of the early years of the Mulroney government was its centralization of power in the Prime Minister and his staff in the PMO. As a result of this trend, the Prime Minister became even more preeminent. Now, by examining the relationship between the House of Commons and Prime Ministers we observe another illustration of this fact.

House of Commons and Prime Ministers

For question period the House is at the centre of attention and fulfils its functions as the prime political forum. However, for most of its time, which is spent in debate, the House is sadly irrelevant and lives up to one member's description of it as "underdeveloped, immature, retarded and defective." [Franks 1987: 157] According to C.E.S. Franks, "Parliament is a place of words, and politics is a war of words." [Franks 1987: 157] Clearly, these words have greater value and meaning if they are communicated to the world outside. Obviously as was demonstrated earlier, the essential links in these connections are the media. And the media, according to C.E.S. Franks, ignores debates. [Franks 1987: 156]

Media interest in debates has declined. As recent as twenty years ago an MP rarely took part in a debate without having at least one paragraph in Canadian Press story. These were translated into the other official language. Franks argues the maiden speech of an MP received even better coverage. Newspapers, however, have lost interest in this coverage, and the Canadian Press has dropped it. The dullness and lack of newsworthiness of debates caused the press to lose interest.

One factor which has made debates less newsworthy is that they are less meaty and interesting than they used to be. Within the last twenty years or so, there has been a sharp decline in participation on behalf of the party leaders. Both

Prime Minister Trudeau and Prime Minister Mulroney have records of very infrequent participation - often a year will pass without the Prime Minister entering into debate.[Franks 1987: 156] With the Prime Minister not participating, other leaders stay out as well. Also, during the Trudeau years the practice of ministers making important statements in the House, with brief responses from frontbench spokesmen of the other parties, was largely dropped. Policy statements were made elsewhere. This helped to make the House irrelevant. Recently attempts have been made to change this with the McGrath reforms of 1985 and more recently with the Harvie Andre reforms of 1991. But there is a strong temptation for the government to make important announcements in speeches outside the House where they are not subject to criticisms and the opposition does not get equal billing.

Clearly, then, political institutions such as the House of Commons and Cabinet, the former moreso than the latter, receive little attention in comparison to the Prime Minister. Realizing that all cabinet systems are designed by Prime Ministers to suit their own personal styles and the particular circumstances of the time, it is clear that any Prime Minister has within his grasp the potential for great power. The key result of this power is a tremendous increase in visibility. [Clark 1985: 191] As Ronald G. Landes states, "Through constitutional evolution and political tradition, the formal executive has become a bit player in the drama of Canadian

politics, while the political executive, especially the Prime Minister, has assumed the leading role. [Landes 1987: 110]

Accepting Landes' argument, then, it can be safely assumed that the Prime Minister's preeminence will diminish very little in the years to come. In fact, if anything the Prime Minister will continue to remain a powerful force within the Canadian political sphere. Many would argue that the Prime Minister should have a dominant role in Canadian politics, and certainly it is not the intent of this work to dispute that opinion. What is of concern in this study, however, is that despite the preeminence of the Prime Minister, there still is a consistent erosion of support for the occupant of the office. Various plausible explanations for this fact are the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE:
APPROACHES TO PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

Having realized that the Prime Minister occupies centre stage in the Canadian political arena, it is now important to examine some of the approaches to public support for leadership. By doing so one can better understand public perception of leaders in Canada. Let us begin by analysing some of the leader image literature.

In analyses of the Diefenbaker-Trudeau eras from 1957 to 1984, Steven Brown, Ronald Lambert, Barry Kay and James Curtis demonstrate that voter's images of the leaders have been invoked with regularity to explain the ebb and flow of party fortunes. Given this, it is surprising that the precise character of the leader factor has attracted so little research attention.

What accounts for the neglect? Clearly, it is not something uniquely Canadian, rather, it seems to derive, at least, in part from the theoretical approaches which inform most comparative voting research. As Miller and his colleagues have pointed out in the United States, the two dominant approaches during the past several decades - the American Voter model and the Rational Choice model have

encouraged investigators to treat the candidate factor as a short term force that is either perceiver - determined or idiosyncratic in nature.[Brown et al 1988: 6]

In the case of the American Voter model, for example, voters' reactions to the leaders, candidates and other campaign stimuli are thought to be shaped in large part by enduring political attitudes such as partisanship. [Brown et al 1988: 7] However, the model provides no theoretical principle to guide investigation of the content of the candidate image that is not, apparently, a product of this partisan screening process.

Those adopting the Rational Choice model, on the other hand, saw voters' reactions to campaign stimuli as products of a deliberative process governed by calculations of voters self interest. While such an approach suggests a strategy for investigating all dimensions of candidate assessment, Rational Choice theorists have shown little inclination to go beyond its narrow appreciation to the candidates' political positions.

Brown et al, probe one dimension of this phenomenon, namely the citizens' organization of cognitive image content. They use the loose conceptual framework surrounding the schema concept to support hypotheses concerning the nature and structure of the public's leader images. [Brown et al 1988: 8] The support they have found for these hypotheses is promising. Their analyses have demonstrated that respondents' image of

the leaders are neither idiosyncratic to a specific leader, nor idiosyncratic to an election. Rather, they illustrate that respondents show evidence of possessing a prototypical leader role scheme that informs their perceptions of the major party leaders in any one election period, and that remains stable from one election to another, despite turnovers in leadership personnel. [Brown et al 1988:8]

Additional support for this approach has come through tests of a hypothesis concerning individual differences. In much of the extant literature, "personal" image content has been treated as an undifferentiated body of attributes, and has for the most part been regarded as a less sophisticated basis of evaluation. While such preliminary tests are encouraging, they also hint at the complexity of the phenomenon with the questions they leave unanswered. For example, the public's image of Pierre Trudeau is an intriguing anomaly in this analysis. His image is distinguished from those of other leaders not only in its richness but also in the emphasis which better-educated observers placed on his personal and political style attributes. Two possible explanations of this pattern suggest themselves.

The first focuses on Trudeau's history of unorthodox behaviour which could have two effects. On the one hand, the out-of-role behaviour may have provided the public with bases for making character inferences that are not normally available to them in the political domain. On the other hand,

such behaviour also may have made the conventional leader role schema less relevant for the public in their attempts to understand Trudeau.

A second explanation centres more on the length of time Trudeau held national office and suggests that the prototypical features of the image may lose their hegemonic position in the schema as the public has more and varied opportunities to observe the leader in different settings.[Brown et al 1988:8] Most of the research on schema formation is concerned with first impressions. As a consequence, either is demonstrated about the effects on schema development of prolonged observation and exposure.

What is clearly missing in the analyses of Brown et al is an assessment of the medias' role in the formulation of leader image. Given the mass media preoccupation with the activities of party leaders in Canada and the leaders' relative longevity in this media limelight, it is surprising that Brown and his colleagues pay so little attention to this important part of leader images. Had they analyzed in greater depth the role of the media their findings would likely have been somewhat different.

David Lanoue addresses the leader image issue in a much different manner as he concentrates solely on television debates. His study on the 1984 leadership debates illustrates that said debates had a significant effect on the vote choices of Canadian citizens, especially backers of the Liberal

party.[Lanoue 1991: 4] This was particularly true of the francophone voters. The Progressive Conservative party gained appreciably from the successful performance of their leader, Brian Mulroney; while the more poorly rates showing of Liberal leader, John Turner damaged his party's prospects. Although viewers thought highly of his debating skills, New Democrat party leader, Ed Broadbent, was unable to translate public sympathy into electoral support. It should be noted, however, that Broadbent's performance may have helped to protect his party's share of the vote in a year when prospects had originally looked very bleak. Nevertheless, the winners of the debates (in terms of their ultimate consequence) were Mulroney and the Conservatives.

There are two important lessons to be drawn from this research. First, while reinforcement of a previous voting position is common and electorally important - effect of debates, it is not the only effect. Debates do have the capacity to influence voting behaviour. LeDuc and Price may well have been correct in their assessment of "Encounter 79" - a debate is less likely to matter to most voters when candidates and platforms are well known and most likely to make a difference during years in which the party leaders are relatively new and/or their platforms are less clear. [Lanoue 1991: 4]

In 1984, of course, the public was getting its first sustained look at two relative newcomers to the leadership of

Canada's most important political parties. The American debate literature suggests that debates may be most influential when voters learn something new from them. Clearly, there was more new information about Turner and Mulroney to be heard in 1984 than there was about the veteran politicians Trudeau and Clark in 1979.

The results found by Lanoue suggest that the effects of this debate involved more than just name recognition and familiarity. John Turner's image suffered as a result of his debate performance and Brian Mulroney's improved. American debate research suggests that voters' look to debates for insights into candidate personality and "character". Voter' response to the 1984 Canadian debates suggests a similar tendency.[Lanoue 1991:5]

In any event, the overall findings certainly square with much of the research reported in the United States. American presidential debates have generally been considered most beneficial to less know challengers from the "out" party (for example, John Kennedy in 1960 and Jimmy Carter in 1976). In addition, U.S. primary election debates (where participants are often largely unknown to most viewers) have been shown to have very strong effects on voters' candidate evaluations and preferences. The 1988 debate results suggest that Canadian debates, too, were most beneficial in the "out" party.[Lanoue 1991: 5]

Secondly, this analysis points suggestively to the

importance of candidate language skills in affecting voters' evaluation of leadership debates. Francophones rated the leaders much differently than did their fellow Canadians. Moreover, the effects of the debates on voting behaviour were much stronger among this group than they were among anglophones. Francophone debate watchers were far more likely to vote Conservative (and less likely to vote Liberal). They rated Mulroney's performance much higher, and Turner's (2nd Broadbent's) quite a bit lower.

While other factors undoubtedly influenced these effects, it is quite possible that the leader's relative skills in speaking French affected these viewers' reactions to the debates. This clearly raises the question of whether it might not be better to send a fluent Francophone proxy to the French-language debate in place of the less proficient party leader. Such a strategy would, no doubt, be risky; the stand-in would certainly suffer from a "stature" gap in comparison with the other party's actual leader. Nevertheless, the findings above suggest that things could hardly have gone worse than they did for John Turner and his liberals among francophone voters in Quebec and elsewhere.

As LeDuc and Price point out, Canadian leadership debates have not been given the same attention as American presidential debates. In part, because there have been fewer such events north of the Canadian/United States border. However, Lanoue's study suggest that Canadian debates have

considerable potential for affecting the choice of voters.

Missing from Lanoue's interpretation of the effects of the televised debates is a broader analysis on the effects of the media in general. His conclusions would have greater application had they been the result of a broader analysis. By focusing so narrowly on the televised debates, other aspects of the media's effects are overlooked.

Having now seen the effects of the media on public support, it is worthwhile to examine other plausible explanations to account for public support in Canada. Certainly, some of the most important work on the subject has been completed by Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke.

In Parliament and Political Support in Canada, Kornberg, Clarke and Stewart contend that Canada confronts support eroding problems that most other mature Liberal democracies have long resolved or are encountering in less acute forms. Various reasons they offer for such a situation may have to do with the distribution of population and natural resources. The regional and central areas versus peripheral cleavages can also be considered a reason - no doubt single member constituency and plurality elections exacerbate these cleavages. In combination they make it difficult for small provinces to represent their interests in the Cabinet or the parliamentary caucuses of the major parties.

Kornberg et al, taken all of these facts into consideration, try to evaluate the behaviour of MP's by

employing two sets of questions: first, they requested that respondents assess several key aspects of the job performance of past and present MP's, second, respondents were asked to focus explicitly on the likelihood that MP's are quick to respond to public needs and demands. Clearly, political culture will condition the criteria citizens use to evaluate a political system.

Kornberg et al purport that quite simply public impressions of MP's involves intimate contact for few. Electronic media, they argue, plays a great role in the image making of MP's. Where Kornberg et al fail is in the restriction of their analyses solely to MP's. Federal party leaders should have been judged using much of the same criteria. One must question whether their findings can be applied on a broader scale.

Kornberg and Clarke analyze political support in greater depth in Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years and in their most recent endeavour Citizens and Community. With respect to why support - especially support for manifestly political objects - waxes and wanes, one reason is that there is a sporadic, almost haphazard quality to the socialization process, particularly, political socialization in a liberal democracy such as Canada. Unlike a visibly authoritarian system such as existed until relatively recently in the Soviet Union and that still exists in the Peoples Republic of China, there are no arms of the state that systematically and

continually expose people to symbols, myths and highly favourable information about the political system and its current leaders and their policies. Hence citizens are not mobilized on a more or less continuing basis to support the regime, its leaders and their policies. In democracies voluntary associations and arms of the state are agents of political socialization in the sense that they periodically provide citizens with politically relevant information and commentary about their country, its government, public officials and the policies they do and do not pursue.

In many ways, political life in contemporary democracies is animated by political parties, and feelings about them also should have important consequences for support. As was observed by Kornberg and Clarke, party identifiers should like their party better than others, and so people identified with a governing party should be more charitable in their evaluations of its stewardship of the economy than are those identified with an opposition party. [Kornberg and Clarke 1991: 23] The nature and levels of inter-party competition also should be relevant. For one thing, the longer a party has been in power, the more likely it is for the distinction between government of the day and government as regime to be defused and for people to praise or blame the regime and not merely an incumbent government for the condition of the country. [Kornberg and Clarke 1991: 13]

The issue priorities of parties and their more general

ideological positions may influence the ways in which people think about government's ability to manage public affairs. When the policy and more general ideological distance between and among parties is substantial, it is likely that people will believe that a recent or anticipated change in the governing party or party coalition will result in new policy initiatives that could have a significant impact on the country's and their own well being. In such a circumstance, judgements about public affairs including the condition of the economy and one's status and how they may be affected by government should be largely future oriented, or "prospective". In contrast, when the policies and ideologies of parties' are very similar, it is unlikely that people may feel that a recent change in the governing party or party coalition will result in "more of the same". Consequently, public judgements will be largely "retrospective", i.e. grounded in perceptions of how well a government has done in the past.

Kornberg and Clarke, to recapitulate, have agreed that representative democracies differing a number of ways from other political systems. Perhaps the most important is that political leaders in democracies must rely on a fund of positive support on the part of citizens rather than an extensive and intensive coercion and indoctrination to sustain their national political communities and regimes and to keep themselves in office. In Citizens and Communities Kornberg

and Clarke state: "The two principal sources, which we term the "twin pillars" of such support, are the political socialization experience of citizens, and their judgements about the ability of political figures, institution and processes to perform their ascribed functions effectively and equitably, and in so doing to provide for national and personal well being". [Kornberg and Clarke 1991: 14]

Though Kornberg and Clarke attribute eroding popularity to economic conditions and/or party affiliation, one other plausible explanation which they only briefly address is the effects of the mass media. In Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years, R. Dick argues that although the media may have facilitated support for the national political community, the negative balance in the coverage of the major parties and their leaders suggests they may have eroded public support for political authorities. [Kornberg and Clarke 1983: 15] No attempt is made to establish a link between media coverage and public attitudes, yet it does seem reasonable to assume that if the public is at all influenced by media evaluations, it could scarcely have avoided formulating negative opinions about both the Liberals and the Conservatives, the two parties with a realistic chance of forming a government. The relationship between support for political authorities, particularly, the Liberals and Trudeau, and support for the regime is suggested by the better reaction in the west to the reelection of the Liberals in 1980. As can be seen in Table A,

support for political authorities ranks much lower than support for the government of Canada or for Canada on a general scale. [See Table A]

Kornberg and Clarke have provided various explanations to account for declining popularity of leaders in this country. Though their findings are worthy of analysis, they overlook one very important contributing factor; the media. As a result, their conclusions may be deemed inadequate. To assess just how short lived popularity is for leaders in this country, it is now worthwhile to analyze election survey data and gallup poll data.

CHAPTER FOUR:FLEETING POPULARITY: ANALYZING THE DATA**Introduction**

As has been previously illustrated the media can be considered a plausible explanation to account for the short lived popularity of many leaders in this country. Understanding that our party leaders receive extensive media coverage while the political institutions receive little coverage in comparison, it is necessary to examine the effects of such consistent scrutiny on the leaders popularity. In other words, it is useful to assess to what extent the leaders in question were affected by the constant attention. Furthermore, it is important to analyze the relative popularity of each of the leaders. Knowing that the downward slope in popularity of each of the leaders to be examined will be different, specific inferences can be made.

In studies since 1968, respondents have been asked to indicate how much they liked or disliked particular political leaders by using a 100-point thermometer scale. This provides a comparable measure of the public's feeling about every major party leader of the past two decades. A summary of these data is presented in Figure 1.1. However, when only referring to specific thermometer readings from 1984 and 1988, the statistics offered come from a panel study taken from these

years. A total sample was conducted in 1984 but not in 1988 and as a result, could not be fairly utilized in this study.

It is evident from the data in Figure 1.1 that there has been a steady erosion of public support for party leaders, both as individuals and collectively. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of Pierre Trudeau, whose career as party leader spanned sixteen years and included the entire decade of the 1970's. From the heavy spring of "Trudeaumania" in 1968 to the bleak February of 1980, positive feelings toward Trudeau declined sharply and steadily. (See Figure 1.1)

The downward trajectory of public feeling about the longtime Liberal leader illustrates a more general pattern. Every party leader of the past two decades has declined in public esteem from the benchmark established in his first election as leader, no matter how popular or unpopular the leader was at that juncture. Thus, Robert Stanfield was less well-liked by the public in 1974 than in 1968, Joe Clark was more poorly regarded in 1980 than in 1979; and John Turner was rated even lower by the public in 1988 than in 1984. (See Figure 1.1) Taken as a group, the three party leaders of 1988 were all less popular than they had been four years earlier.

Ed Broadbent presents only a modest exception to this pattern, as his standing with the public improved between 1980 and 1984 (See Figure 1.1) But this upswing in Broadbent's popularity proved to be only temporary. In 1988, his rating resumed its decline, dropping to the lowest recorded during

his long political career. Time has not been kind to the leaders of Canada's political parties, even those who have enjoyed substantial degrees of electoral success. [Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, and Pammett 1991: 91]

Pierre Trudeau

More than any other party leader, at least since John Diefenbaker, Pierre Trudeau evoked strong public sentiments. People either loved him or hated him, few were indifferent. At his peak in 1968, he was the most popular figure of the era. At his lowest point following his retirement in 1984, his rating had fallen to below the neutral point on the thermometer; 48 C. (Figure 1.2)

Trudeau's public image was complex, and underwent several significant changes during his long tenure as leader of the Liberal party and as Prime Minister. But certain elements of his image recurred again and again in national surveys, and some of these were evident in embryonic form even in 1968, when Trudeau fought his first campaign as party leader. Voters were quick to recognize his intelligence, his leadership abilities, and his personal magnetism. Trudeau's intelligence and leadership ability were themes mentioned by respondents with increasing frequency as positive attributes, even as politics took its toll on his popularity. (See Figure 1.3) At the time of the 1980 election, even though the public's affection for Trudeau had declined considerably from its

earlier high, 26% of the national sample mentioned "intelligence" as one of his positive qualities, and 18% mentioned "leadership" (See Figure 1.3) Both figures represented increases in the frequency with which these attributes had been mentioned in previous years.

Even at the height of his popularity, however, there were aspects of Trudeau's personality that were perceived negatively by much of the public. From the beginning, there was a feeling that he lacked concern for ordinary Canadians, and that he was preoccupied with Quebec and the Constitution at the expense of other pressing issues, particularly the economy. In 1968, a "playboy" image and perceived lack of seriousness about public affairs were the most frequently mentioned negatives found in the data. (See Figure 1.3)

However, it was "arrogance" that became the most clearly established negative component of the Trudeau image. The number of Canadians who saw Trudeau as arrogant and aloof rose steadily throughout his political career, with 22% of respondents in the 1980 study describing him in this way, and additional numbers using terms like "conceited" or "dictatorial". (See Figure 1.3) Toward the end of his career, these negatives weighed as heavily as the positives, in part accounting for the steady erosion of Trudeau's popularity. The negative perceptions, particularly those from the West where Trudeau became highly unpopular after 1974, were often passionate. "His arrogance... a let them eat cake

attitude...his favouritism toward Quebec...he just doesn't give a damn about the people of this country...an arrogant bastard." [Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, and Pammett 1991: 94]

Despite responses such as these, Trudeau continued to be accorded at the very least a grudging respect, even among some who disliked either his personality or his policies. One important reason that he continued to look good to many voters was the comparison to his major rival in his first three elections, Conservative leader Robert Stanfield. Although often described as "honest" and "sincere," the widespread perception of Stanfield as a dull, plodding leader heightened the perception of Trudeau as a dynamic, if somewhat unconventional, one. [Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, and Pammett 1991: 93] Stanfield's popularity declined even more steeply than did Trudeau's, and the advantage enjoyed by Trudeau over his rival on a personal level was actually greater in 1974 than it had been in 1968. By the end of the 1970's, however, this gap had narrowed considerably. After more than a decade in office, Trudeau was hardly the popular, even heroic, figure that he had been in 1968. In 1984, the situation worsened even more as Trudeau's thermometer reading had dropped to 48 C (See Figure 1.2)

Ed Broadbent

Realizing that Broadbent never evoked passions in the way that Trudeau did, he was nonetheless generally liked by the voters. More popular with the public than predecessors

Tommy Douglas and David Lewis, and more highly regarded than Turner in 1984 and 1988, Broadbent was deemed by many to be the greatest asset of the NDP prior to the 1988 election. (Figure 1.4) In a Gallup Poll taken during the spring of 1988, 34% of those sampled felt that Broadbent would make a better Prime Minister than either Mulroney or Turner. [Gallup Report June 1988]

Clearly, the reasons for Broadbent's continued popularity were that he projected an image of honesty and sincerity, and of concern for the common people. (See Figure 1.5) A good speaker and debater, he appeared as an intelligent, articulate alternative to the leaders of the other parties. Looking at Figure 1.5, decency, sincerity, and confidence were always his strongest traits. Few voters thought of him as shallow or arrogant. Some would argue that this can be attributed to the fact that Broadbent has never been in power at the federal level.

The negative aspects of Broadbent's public image had less to do with the man than with his party. Jon Pammet argues that any NDP leader can, by definition, be viewed as too extreme to constitute a politically credible alternative. In other words, Broadbent was never able to break completely away from an identification with party and ideology. By 1988, Broadbent's thermometer reading hovered around 48 C. (See Figures 1.4 and 1.6)

John Turner

During most of his earlier public career, Turner had projected a strong, dynamic image. He had a forceful, direct style that suggested honesty and sincerity, and a handsome, athletic appearance. (See Figure 1.7) In an age that places a high value on telegenic qualities, he was a potential star. Some of these traits were still in evidence in 1984. "He's honest...straightforward...tells it like it is... has the experience...looks like a Prime Minister. [Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1991: 100]

Unfortunately, Turner could not project an image of confidence and self-assurance. Given to a nervous habit of clearing his throat when speaking, Turner appeared hesitant and unsure of himself. [Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1991: 100] All at once he had to deal with new issues and new adversaries. He wanted to inject new life into the party. But in the short time available, he could not free himself of the legacy of the later Trudeau years, even though he had not been a part of them.

Turner vowed to rebuild the party and lead it back to power. Although he survived a vote of confidence in his leadership, he faced continuing revolts within party ranks from those who felt that the party could never revive under him. [Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1991: 100] His image sagged further, and his inability to exercise control over his own party became another negative component of his public image.

Seizing the free trade issue as his cause, Turner sought to revive his leadership with a vigorous campaign against the Agreement. Yet, too much damage had already been done to Turner's public image. Even though the Liberals surged briefly in the polls following the 1988 debates, the Conservatives successfully exploited many of the negative elements of Turner's image. After leading the party to its second consecutive defeat in 1988, Turner had achieved the distinction of being the most unsuccessful federal Liberal leader in modern Canadian history.

Brian Mulroney

Although well known in party circles, in part because of his unsuccessful leadership bid in 1976, Mulroney had never held an elective public office when he became leader of the Progressive Conservative party. As a result, he was still largely unknown to much of the public when he faced them in an election for the first time as party leader. Yet, in 1984 when Brian Mulroney led his party to a landslide victory, his popularity peaked at 62 C which contrasted to Turner's 50 C and Broadbent's 58 C. (See Figures 1.2 and 1.4)

To many, Mulroney's landslide victory in 1984 was not simply due to his personality. Tired of the Trudeau years and uninspired by John Turner, the voters were ready for change. A good speaker, Mulroney was highly effective in both French and English in the debates which were held during the 1984 campaign. He attacked the Turner Liberals relentlessly, and

projected an image of confidence and self-assurance. (See Figure 1.9)

Although the negatives in Mulroney's image were there from the beginning, they did not become fully developed in the public mind until after he had become Prime Minister. While many voters saw him as "honest" and "sincere", a nearly equal number found him insincere or untrustworthy. (See Figure 1.9) His smooth-running campaign machine gave him an image of slickness which was often negatively received. (See Figure 1.9)

However, the image that would probably most affect Mulroney was that of a man whose public statements could not be trusted. According to various writers, he attacked Turner relentlessly over the issue of patronage, and then dispensed it freely once in office. Furthermore, having gone on record as being against the concept of free trade with the United States, Mulroney as Prime Minister became the architect of the Free Trade Agreement. By 1988, his thermometer reading dropped to 50.4 C, while Turner's and Broadbent's were 42 C and 48 C respectively. (See Figures 1.4 and 1.6)

The Media

As has been clearly illustrated, the media's role is paramount in the process of conveying images of the party leaders to the public. The vast majority of Canadians have never seen any of the party leaders in person, yet they are

familiar figures on the television screen or in the newspapers. Unquestionably people have come to rely more and more on television as the main source of political information, television images are increasingly the reality for much of the public. (See Figure 2.0)

Televised debates between the leaders have also come to play an increasingly important role. It is becoming more difficult for party leaders to avoid such encounters even when it is not in their best interests to debate their opponents on television. Certainly John Turner in 1984 and perhaps Ed Broadbent in 1988 would have been better off without the debates which took place in each of those campaigns. But the election in which such a debate does not occur is becoming more of a rarity, and debates are now a fundamental part of a campaign strategy.

Although the debates draw a vast audience, their importance in shaping the images of leaders is probably much greater than suggested by many analysts. This is largely due to the fact that the debates spill over into other aspects of the leader's image and quickly blend into the public's ongoing evaluations of the leaders. Journalists write about the televised debates, and excerpts of them appear on the news broadcasts and in party campaign commercials. [Taras 1990: 123] Particularly for leaders whose images are relatively formless, such as Mulroney in 1984, the debates provide a major image-creating opportunity. For those whose images are

more clearly defined by past events, as was the case with Turner or Broadbent in 1988, they offer a crucial strategic opening.

As can be seen in Figure 2.1 , those who watched the debates in 1984 or 1988 were able to differentiate between the relative performance of the participants. Using a ten-point performance scale, Turner was rated the best of the three leaders in the 1988 debates, and the worst of the three in 1984, an ordering consistent with most of the journalistic commentary on the debates.

A positive performance on a televised debate however, is no reason to assume that the leader in question will win the election; John Turner represents case and point. His performance in the 1988 election debate was deemed by many to be the best single performance of his political career, yet it was not enough to win him the election. It is safe to assume, however, that a strong television performance, not necessarily only in debates, will affect the public in a positive manner. This is not always enough to win elections but it is definitely a good means to garner support.

Leaders and Issues

A leader's position on a particular issue is important, to some degree, in affecting public perception. Because Turner felt as strongly as he did on the Free Trade issue, the 1988 televised debate illustrated this fact. The immediate result

was an increase of 2.5 points for Turner on a "Debate Performance Rating" from the debate four years prior. (See Figure 2.1)

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that these issues are often times short-term forces. In other words, free trade, the dominant issue in the 1988 campaign, was not even on the agenda four years earlier. Unemployment, a major concern in 1984 had disappeared from the agenda in 1988. (See Figure 2.3) The major feature of the Canadian public's concern with issues in the last two decades has been a propensity to change the "important" issue from one election year to the next. In its continuing search for solutions to pressing problems, the electorate has accepted altered issue agendas quite readily. Whether these agendas stem from public perceptions of rising prices, media analysis of the worsening job situation, or a party's portrayal of a desirable or disastrous future under free trade, the electorate is prone to adopt these interpretations of problems, and abandon those it had supported in previous years. [Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, and Pammett 1991: 84]

Party leader's pronouncements concerning salient issues are widely publicized and the Canadian public's attitude toward the leaders can be shaped by how they perceive the leaders will treat these issues. In other words, if unemployment is the pressing issue for a sector of the public and a leader adopts this as his "running issue", he will

certainly capture the attention of this particular segment of Canadian society. That is not to say however, that he will necessarily capture their votes if the candidate is a member of the N.D.P. Whatever the case, it is safe to assume that this group of individuals will look favourably upon the leader in question.

Assessment of Data

If we look specifically at Prime Ministers Mulroney and Trudeau, as we have consistently throughout this study, we see that both men clearly declined in popularity from their early days of governance. However, Mulroney declined far more sharply than did Trudeau. It is worthwhile, then, to assess the reasoning behind such a difference in the erosion of support for both leaders. Clearly, Trudeau managed to stay in the good graces of the public longer than any other individual in this study. To explain this fact, it is worthwhile to return to a point mentioned earlier; Trudeau expressed a disdain for the media and the public that Mulroney did not. He acted aloof and distant toward the media and they laboured for his attention and respect. The result of this was quite simply that the public responded in a manner consistent with the media's. They considered him mysterious and captivating, and early in his Prime Ministership this was deemed a good feat since it enticed individuals to try understand this supposed complex man.

Still others have argued that Pierre Trudeau was quite

simply, a "better performer" than Mulroney. [Landes 1987: 101] Trudeau performed well in all arenas most of the time - for Canadian Prime Ministers and party leaders all of the following can be considered arenas: the party, the Cabinet, the legislature, the media, intergovernmental relations, elections, and interest groups. These overlap in practical politics, of course, but remain distinct concepts for the exercise of leadership. The personal qualities of leaders are tested differently in each arena. As was said earlier, Trudeau performed well in all arenas most of the time; whereas in comparison, Mulroney did not. Certainly an argument can be made that Trudeau was an uneven performer in the House, but when moved, could speak forcefully. He dominated the media by attacking them. The point here is not to celebrate Trudeau but to illustrate that the true measure of good leadership is a simultaneous mastery of key arenas. Some would argue this is quite simply an unreasonable expectation. However, regardless of such opinions Trudeau's success in the political arenas did not hurt him.

Mulroney, on the other hand, did not have the same ability to master the various arenas and as a result did not remain in the good graces of the public for as long. As was previously stated, in 1984, his thermometer reading was approximately 62 C. (See Figures 1.2 and 1.4) By 1988, it had dropped to 50 C. (See Figures 1.4 and 1.6) This depreciation in support was far more dramatic than either Turner or

Broadbent. (See Figure 1.4)

In order to further assess the data presented, it is necessary to revert back to the basic premise of the study; all leaders of the past two decades have declined in public support from the benchmark established in their first election as leader, no matter how popular the leader was at that juncture. The most obvious reasoning behind such a fact is the dawning of the age of television. As people have come to rely more and more on television as a source of political information, media images are increasingly the reality for much of the public. As was previously stated, a Prime Minister cannot successfully lead unless he is able to sell policies and a vision of the country to the public, for without support from the public even the best plans are doomed to failure. However, as we know, the media have their own agenda and interpretation - if they choose, for whatever reason, to discuss a Prime Minister in a negative light, their negative image will sweep across the country. Accepting this fact, the consistent erosion of support for leaders is really not that surprising.

Having compared the various thermometer scores of party leaders over time, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, all leaders examined in this study suffered an erosion of support. Second, even though Mulroney was far more popular than either Turner or Broadbent in 1984, by 1988 his popularity had declined far more rapidly than either of these men,

illustrating just how volatile the Canadian electorate can be. Third, although Trudeau enjoyed public popularity longer than Mulroney or for that matter any other party leader examined in this study, he still received negative responses from Canadians and eventually declined in popularity as the others did. Fourth, the involvement of the media accounts to a large extent for the downward slope of leaders popularity. As was clearly stated, since the media (mainly television) is the driving force behind formulating public perception, it should not be surprising that the media's negative images of Canadian leaders very quickly become adopted as the general public's negative images. Fifth and finally, the leaders' positions on the issues of the day, to some extent, also help explain public perception.

Combining these claims, then, it becomes clear that the conditions under which any Prime Minister governs compels him to wield his authority strictly on sufferance. His retention of office as demonstrated in this study, is continually under attack; he can never ignore incipient dissatisfaction and revolt among his own supporters, and he must soothe the ruffled feelings and anticipate the indignant outbreaks before they reach the acute stage. He must never lose sight of the paramount necessity of retaining the confidence of the House and, beyond the House, of the electorate. No matter how lofty his position, he can always be defeated and replaced. Clearly, the most any Prime Minister can enjoy is fleeting

popularity.

CHAPTER FIVE:
MEDIA: A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION

Introduction

Understanding that despite his preeminency the popularity of the Prime Minister erodes, it is now important to examine why this is so. Many academics, such as Kornberg and Clarke, have suggested that the state of the economy and partisanship are the two main reasons to explain such a decline in popularity. Clearly, one very important area, the media to be more specific, is being completely overlooked. Realizing that the media plays a role in the formulation of public perception, it is important to understand the relationship between our leaders and the media.

The Role of the Media

In Canada today, considerable emphasis is placed on the responsiveness of our political leaders and institutions of government to the attitudes of the public. Frederick Fletcher argues that in order to be successful, a Prime Minister must be first and foremost a public persuader.[Fletcher 1977:86] The media are the instruments for transmitting the prime minister's message to his party, the government and the public. Yet, the media have their own priorities and interests and vigorously pursue their own agendas. As David Taras

states, "the Prime Minister must have an understanding of media routines and be skilled in packaging, choreographing, and manipulating in order to have his intentions conveyed in a positive light". [Taras 1988:45] Evidently, the relationship between the Prime Minister and the media has both sides seeking definition and recognition - each side constantly struggling one against the other.

Prime Ministers and the media have different interests, agendas, and codes of conduct. To remain in office, Prime Ministers must try to satisfy large and disparate blocs of voters and many divergent interests. To many, the media's obligation is to criticize and play an opposition role. [Taras 1988: 42] One Globe and Mail editor stated that the best stories are always "government in trouble" stories because Canadians only want to hear about the blunders and errors of their government. [Taras 1990: 46]

It has been argued that Canadian journalists have been influenced by the post-Watergate machismo that became prominent during the 1970s. The prevailing view was that politicians were to be looked upon with suspicion; approval of government policies or statements was a sign of weakness and careers could be made by exposing incompetence and corruption at the top. Strong scepticism and "a culture of disparagement" seem firmly embedded. A former parliamentary correspondent for the CBC has complained that "everybody wants to write like Allan Fotheringham. Journalists have been

reduced to a bunch of smart-alecks. Can't a Prime Minister ever be right? Can't a policy ever be good?"[Taras 1988:43] In Canada, investigative journalism almost always means exposing government flaws and ineptitude.

Any argument that the relationship between the politicians and the media shapes the public perception of leaders must begin with how that often stormy relationship has changed in recent Canadian history. There is little question that journalists have, over time, gained considerable power both within the newsmaking process and in society. Once largely the servants of the organizations they worked for, following blindly the whims and dictates of their publishers, Canadian journalists have achieved significant professional status, considerable discretion over what they can say, write, and do and, with this, the ability to set the political agenda. From being the handmaidens of the political parties, journalists have gained at least an even hand and some would even say the upper hand in their relations with their politicians.[Taras 1990:41] Prominent journalists enjoy recognition and prestige and on many occasions, can have significant influence.

The power of journalists is exercised in a number of ways. The most salient fact is that journalists, as a group, can prevent some aspects of politician's or a government's message from reaching the public. [Taras 1990: 41] They can do this by not covering speeches or news conferences that are

important to politicians, or covering them in such a way that political appeals are filtered, blunted, or discredited. Journalists determine which eight or twelve second visual clips or which quotations will be used in their stories. They also decide how much attention to give to the views of opponents, and to the political motives behind a particular proposal, appointment, or policy, and the flaws that may exist in it. They can screen out some messages while widely exposing others. They have the power to take events out of context and recontextualize them so that they fit into the media's requirements for a good story. Collectively, they have the power to be the gatekeeper of public information.[Taras 1990: 42] Hence, in the process of controlling what is publicized, they are aiding the public in formulating opinions of their leaders.

At first glance, it seems that political leaders are at a disadvantage in dealing with the media. Journalists have the power to decide which politicians will be interviewed and to choose the words that will be quoted in newspaper articles or used in TV and radio clips. They provide the context within which the politician's remarks are presented. They also have the last word: emphasizing contradictions, taking the politician to task for missed opportunities, or stressing what they - not the politician - consider important.[Bennett 1988:73-73] Moreover, journalists and especially television journalists are surrounded by auras of authority and

objectivity. As P.H. Weaver has written,

There is hardly an aspect of the scripting, casting, and staging of a television news program that is not designed to convey an impression of authority and omniscience. This can be seen by most strikingly in the role of anchorman... who is positively godlike: he summons forth men, events and images at will; he speaks in tones of utter certainty; he is the person with whom all things begin and end. [Iyengar and Kinder 1987:126]

Indeed, political leaders are unlikely to look as good on television as the journalists who report them. TV journalists are usually chosen for the ease and comfort of their on-camera presence; moreover, their words and delivery are often edited and lines repeated until they are perfect. In contrast, television cameras often catch politicians at awkward moments. Unlike TV journalists, they cannot do retakes, reformulate their words, or be made to appear as though they are authoritatively in control of events.

In addition, journalists, who do not have to bear the weight of office, often appear bolder than government leaders. Journalists are free to make witty remarks about people and events or argue for snap solutions and instant action. As Thomas Griffith observed about the attractiveness of popular American journalists, "Ted Koppel often seems more knowledgeable than the experts he questions, and George Wil triumphantly bolder than Cabinet members who, unlike him, must bear responsibility for what they say. [Griffith 1987:] In contrast, foreign governments, the financial community, or

powerful interest groups will hold a Prime Minister or national party leader accountable for his or her words.

Virtually all modern Prime Ministers have complained about their treatment by the media. The standard complaints are that their messages have been distorted by the media's need to personalize and sensationalize issues, and that important concerns are often overshadowed by the attention given to minor scandals, trivia, and gaffes. [Fletcher 1977:98] They are also surprised by the intense criticism that greets any action. Prime Minister Lester Pearson claimed in his day that:

Newspaper editors are always bleating about the refusal of politicians to produce mature and responsible discussion of the issues. The fact is when we discuss policies seriously, we are not reported at all or reported very inadequately. Reporters do not appear even to listen, until we say something controversial or personal, charged with what they regard as news value. [Fletcher 1977:99-100]

Two decades later Brian Mulroney made similar charges: "There's a cottage industry in this country that deals with facile and mostly pejorative references to what any Prime Minister is doing at a given time.... I'm not saying it with bitterness, I'm saying it calmly, as a matter of fact. The message has been distorted in going out." [Comber and Mayne 1986: 13].

One can predict with virtual certainty that Prime Ministers will endure a "media crisis" at least once during their term of office. A media crisis occurs when the media

seizes on an issue that embarrasses the government and makes it a leading news item for a considerable length of time.[Arterton 1978: 28] The media, not the government, set the agenda. The Prime Minister is placed on the defensive and relations with the media deteriorate sharply amid antagonism and mistrust. During Brian Mulroney's first term in office, for instance, he often spoke about the country's improved economy and what he saw as a new harmony in federal-provincial relations; during the same period, the media focused relentlessly on scandals and broken campaign pledges.[Taras 1990:126] Mulroney's message was drowned out by a steady downpour of stories about Cabinet ministers in trouble. Faced with a media crisis, Mulroney was forced to undertake new survival strategies to win back control of the agenda. Some politicians, Joe Clark and John Turner, for example, never fully recovered from the wounds inflicted by the media during similar crises.[Taras 1990: 121] Mark Hertsgaard compares political leaders to lion tamers, with journalists being the lions, and claims that even with obedient lions, "they only had to pounce once in the space of four years to leave their master's bloodied if not buried". [Hertsgaard 1988: 18]

Yet, Prime Ministers are not altogether defenceless. They have a number of formidable weapons that can be used in their battle with the media, weapons that allow them to affect the media agenda and get their messages out to the public relatively unfiltered. Clearly, television is a popular weapon

and one that receives a great deal of attention.

Television: Powerful Weapon or Not?

Many observers believe that a politician's ability to perform on television is his or her most important political asset. Where political leaders were once distant figures seen firsthand by only small numbers of people, television's intimacy has now made them a familiar presence to the majority of Canadians. Audiences feel that they have a relationship with the politicians they see on television, that they have "met" and "know" them personally. As Robert Lichter and his colleagues point out, "the stars of television, from anchormen, to rock performers, to politicians, have become pseudo-intimate acquaintances." [Lichter, Rollaman and Lichter 1986: 10]

There are two schools of thought about the influence of television performance on political success. One view is that television appearance carries enormous political weight. Joshua Meyrowitz, for instance, believes that some of the great leaders of the past would not have made it in today's political world because they would not have projected well on television. [Meyrowitz 1985: 275] Some Canadian journalists argue that Robert Stanfield's gaunt looks and slow, deliberate speaking style, Joe Clark's weak chin and gawky body language, and John Turner's burning stare and overbearing "hotness" on television damaged their chances for political success. [Taras

1990: 121] On the other hand, Pierre Trudeau's natural instinct for television may have helped him survive his many political wars. According to a former press secretary, Romeo Leblanc, Trudeau's face, voice, and gestures were just right for television. [Taras 1990: 121] Trudeau lasted as long as he did because he had strong control over every muscle" when he faced the "electronic cannons." On TV every bead of sweat, every twitch becomes an editorial. [Taras 1990: 122]

Anthropologist Max Atkinson contends that only certain speaking styles are suitable for television. [Atkinson 1984: 173] TV rewards those who appear "cool", low-key, and casual. A controversial speaking style and relaxed delivery are the prerequisites of a convincing performance. Atkinson considers Ronald Reagan and Francois Mitterand to be consummate TV performers, affecting a casual confidence on television and appearing relaxed, as if talking to neighbours across a picket fence. [Atkinson 1984: 173] Some of history's greatest orators - Leon Trotsky, Adolph Hitler, Huey Long - might have looked foolish on television. Their dramatic gestures, flailing arms and pounding fists would have looked overheated and frantic. As Atkinson advises:

Practices which are visible, audible and impressive to those sitting in the back row of an auditorium are likely to seem exaggerated, unnatural and even oppressive when viewed on a small screen from a distance of two feet. [Atkinson 1984: 175-176]

Moreover, television by nature coarsens and distorts reality. Virtually all mannerisms are exaggerated: imperfect

chins look far more imperfect, a hand seems to shake more than it actually does, sudden movements give someone a frenetic look. American media advisor Michael Sheehan warns, "if you are a neutral or thoughtful person, you look dead or embalmed on the air. That's why you have to smile." [Sheehan 1988: 28] For many, the greatest difficulty is having to express a complex idea in the ten to fifteen seconds allowed by television's time frames. There is often too little time to build an argument or to discuss the history or background of an event or policy. Under these conditions, the glib politician may have an advantage over the thoughtful one.

There is also the argument that television uses or burns up politicians very quickly. The audience's demand for fresh faces, new formats, and a steady stream of jolts ensures a constant turnover. According to David Taras, with the exception of Rene Levesque, Canada has not produced a national political leader completely comfortable with the medium. [Taras 1990: 123]

Some believe that success on television can be translated easily into political success and can overcome or reverse failures suffered in other political arenas. Scholars have noted that after the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, John F. Kennedy's popularity rating shot up dramatically. [Paletz and Entman 1981: 103] A stirring television performance where he admitted making mistakes had turned a foreign policy failure into a domestic political

triumph. Mark Hertsgaard describes how Ronald Reagan undertook a public relations blitz to stress his commitment to excellence in education. Viewers were treated to scenes of a seemingly activist president visiting classrooms, mingling with students, and talking to educators across the country. "The end result," according to Hertsgaard, "was to reverse the polling figures to a two-to-one support for Reagan, without the actual Reagan policy changing at all." [Hertsgaard 1988: 48-49] When White House aide Michael Deaver was asked by reporters about cuts that Reagan had made to the education budget, his reply was "You can say whatever you want, but the viewer sees Ronald Reagan out there in a classroom talking to teachers and kids, and what he takes from that is the impression that Ronald Reagan is concerned about education." [Smith 1988:418-419]

Similarly, public support for John Turner swung dramatically following his strong showing against Brian Mulroney in the 1988 election debates. [1988 Election Survey Data] Turner's performance, accomplished with the help of TV coaches, managed to supersede, at least for a brief period, the realities of a bitterly divided party, botched policy announcements, and a negative image built up over the previous five years. [Taras 1990: 123] In one evening, Turner came close to turning his political fortunes around completely.

The other view is that television has little overall impact. The public, it has been said, will judge leaders on

their policies; their intelligence, ability, and trustworthiness, and the degree to which they can express and symbolize the national mood. Viewers can see through TV window dressing and they arrive at decisions based on economic interests, beliefs, and ideology. Moreover, the modern political landscape has been and is filled with leaders who attained high office despite the fact that they were not highly telegenic. The congenial and shrewd Lester Pearson came across as cold and stilted and relentlessly uninspiring. Peter C. Newman has described Pearson's difficulties with the new medium:

Expert after expert was given complete freedom to make him look as warm on TV as he was with small groups of friends. A voice coach was brought in from Toronto, and writers were hired to remove as many sibilants as possible from his scripts so that he could hide his speech problem. Toronto's MacLaren Advertising Company exhausted its considerable resources trying to improve his television manner. The TV manipulators tried a dozen of different settings-intimate sources, crowded scenes, living room shots, interviews with academics - but nothing really worked. [Newman 1968:69]

While the ability to project well on television may not be a prerequisite for attaining high office, most observers agree that the skilful use of television can yield enormous benefits to a politician. [Taras 1990: 124] While the visual press release has become part of the media repertoire of Canadian Prime Ministers, the circumstances are different from countries such as the United States. Largely because of Question Period, where Prime Ministers are pressed into

emotional exchanges, swept up in the frenzy of attack and counter-attack, and exposed fully to harsh questioning from the opposition, an immaculate television image is nearly impossible to maintain.[Fletcher 1984: 114] Attacks by the opposition often make the best footage, and the Prime Minister is often shown in a less than flattering light. As the Prime Minister cannot control Question Period, he or she cannot control the television images that Question Period produces.

Method to the Madness

As image building is critical to the Prime Minister's survival, the Prime Minister's Office has developed formidable resources to deal with the media. The Prime Minister has a director of communications, a press secretary, speech writers, and a battery of other staff to help formulate an overall media strategy and deal with reporter's daily news requirements. Cabinet documents now contain communications strategies that describe, often in considerable detail, how policies are to be sold. The Prime Minister's Office constantly monitors media coverage, wages image-building campaigns, and attempts to orchestrate issues, events, and situations so that as one journalist phrased it- " the most favourable public relations juice is squeezed out".[Gratton 1987: 110] The art of media management rests on the ability to direct reporters to stories and points of view that the government wants reported, while hindering the coverage of

events or perspectives that would detract from the government's message or prove to be embarrassing.

According to David Taras, one weapon that is sometimes used is access to the Prime Minister.[Taras 1990:125] Under Trudeau, access was limited and held out as a reward to favoured reporters; Mulroney has also used this approach. The basic understanding is that access will be given in exchange for favourable coverage. Journalists who receive an exclusive tip or who are allowed to interview the Prime Minister have an advantage over other reporters and gain enhanced stature and credibility within their own news organizations. The news organization itself can benefit by operating with the Prime Minister. One network remembers being upbraided by a member of Brian Mulroney's staff and told that "If you don't shape up (names a TV program) won't get an interview with the Prime Minister". [Comber and Mayne 1980:20]

Leaking a story to a favoured reporter has a number of advantages. A leak about an impending policy announcement, for instance, gives the government two opportunities instead of one to promote its policy. The first opportunity comes with the reporting of the leak.[Camp 1988:133] The second is the coverage that occurs when the policy is announced.[Camp 1988:133] As the first responses to a policy are often the ones that have the most impact on public opinion, the government has a great deal at stake in ensuring that these reports are favourable. Leaking information to reporters is

also a means of testing public opinion. If news reports about a proposed initiative or appointment produce a hostile reaction from the public, then the government can deny the report's validity and retreat without losing face.

Leaking information to favoured journalists can also backfire, as it can arouse the resentment of other reporters. One CBC reporter interviewed by David Taras still retains a measure of resentment against Joe Clark because "he played friends".[Taras 1990: 126] Politicians also have to play the game with subtlety. Reporters are suspicious about being co-opted and resent attempts to manipulate them.

Journalists who are seen as hostile risk being frozen out by the Prime Minister, as well as by ministers and key government and party officials. Being put in a "deep freeze" can impair a reporter's ability to do daily reporting because reporters often need basic background information and facts confirmed before they file their stories. George Radwanski has observed that "nothing hurts a journalist more than being denied access, because we lose favour with our bosses".[Taras 1990:126] The danger is not only that other reporters will get the story instead of those frozen out but that even their own organizations may view them as abrasive and, hence, as a liability.

Another method of manipulating the media is for politicians to provide reporters with pre-packaged news. News is manufactured for the media. A story line is presented in

briefings, photo opportunities are available so that reporters have good visuals, and press releases explain the background and significance of the event or policy that is being promoted. According to David Taras, "as reporters have to produce news stories almost every day, whether or not there is real news, some reporters depend on the government to serve up a steady diet of stories". [Taras 1990:127] Michael Gratton, a former press secretary to Brian Mulroney, argues "journalists are considerably more docile when well-nourished with material". [Gratton 1987:110]

Many reporters have come to view Question Period as an attempt to create pre-packaged news.[Fraser and Howard 1988:A1] Reporters are often forewarned about the questions that the opposition parties intend to ask so that they know when the sharp confrontations - the sparks that make for good visuals - are likely to occur and over which issues.[Fraser and Howard 1988:A1] The Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers come well armed with answers that have been scripted and rehearsed in advance. Playing to the media's need for drama has, for many, replaced any obligation to address the questions being asked. As Brian Mulroney once put it, "It's all theatre; once I understood that I was all set". [Fraser and Howard 1988:A1] Although many journalists view Question Period in terms of winners and losers, the reality is that Question Periods rarely produce a long-term winner or a positive image for any of the participants. The public is

routinely exposed to shouting matches, insults, and the emotions of blind partisanship. It is strange that people then wonder why the public often judges its leaders in a negative light.

Scrums, with reporters tightly milling around the person being questioned and jostling against each other for a good position, are also an opportunity for the Prime Minister or party leader to convey a tightly scripted message.[McInnes 1989:A3] The line of the day has been rehearsed, and key phrases are repeated so that reporters will include them in TV and radio clips or as quotes in articles.[McInnes 1989:A3] Colin Seymour-Ure warns, however, that scrums can prove dangerous:

An unstructured exchange increases the risks of the person giving out information: he is more likely to be caught off guard, or to make a mistake, or to be misunderstood - even at the simple level of the answer to one question being taken to refer to another. There may be difficulty in ending the exchanges, too, if the Prime Minister is almost literally boxed in.
[Seymour- Ure 1989: 313]

Diversions are another commonly used tactic. Governments often attempt to blunt the harmful effects of a negative story by scheduling a "good news" event for the same day.[Taras 1990:128] The hope is that more attention will be given to the news that shows the government in a flattering light than on the news that is damaging. For instance, the Mulroney government announced its day care initiative on the

same day as the release of the Parker Inquiry report into the activities of former Cabinet minister Sinclair Stevens. [Taras 1990:129]

Above all, Prime Ministers set the ground rules for reporting. Interviews are only granted under conditions that are likely to produce favourable coverage. Prime Ministers may insist that television interviews be conducted live, for example, so that the interviews will be aired fully and not extensively edited. As well they can wish to see the tape so that they can edit it themselves.

A subtle method of influencing media coverage is by creating a climate of expectations among reporters, expectations that become the standard against which the Prime Minister's or the government's performance will be judged. Geoffrey Stevens has described how Prime Ministers can create a sense of crisis, for instance, that will make them appear as the saviours of a situation.[Fletcher 1987:169] Stevens remembers that during the battle over the Constitution in 1981, government representatives repeatedly stressed that a deadlock had been reached and that a resolution was virtually impossible.[Fletcher 1987:169] When an agreement was finally concluded, the media having been conditioned that the talks would prove fruitless, proclaimed it as a historical breakthrough even though Quebec had not given the deal its approval and the provinces had the power to sidestep the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[Fletcher 1987:169]

Nonetheless, the Prime Minister appeared to have triumphed over seemingly insurmountable odds.

Public relations experts suggest that there are a number of basic rules to successful political salesmanship. The message must be simple, it must be newsworthy and it must be credible. Simplicity, newsworthiness, and credibility are the cornerstones of image making. With a positive image, a leader is likely to remain in the good graces of the public for a longer period.

The Relationship Between Prime Ministers and the Media

Analysts believe that relationships between politicians and the media are determined by factors and processes largely beyond the control of either party. In their study of media coverage of U.S. presidents, David Paletz and Robert Entman argue that reporting is conditioned by specific settings and circumstances, that is coverage reflects the nature of the events and situations being reported.

Michael Grossman and Martha Kumar contend that the relationship between U.S. presidents and White House reporters changes according to the normal gravitational pulls experienced during a four-year term, and that the relationship is characterized by predictable phases.[Grossman and Kumar 1981:277] The first phase they describe is the alliance phase.[Grossman and Kumar 1981:277] For a brief period, anywhere from six weeks to six months, the interests of newly elected leaders and the journalists who are covering them

coincide. The media's main interest is to convey the information that the public wants about the president's character: family, friends, life-style, hobbies, personal style and a sense of his past.[Grossman and Kumar 1981:278] Almost invariably, personality profiles of the presidents are friendly and policies are treated with respect. A strong feeling exists among reporters that the new person should be given a chance to perform and that, until then, criticism would be unfair. [Grossman and Kumar 1981: 278]

The question for Canadian observers is whether a similar alliance phase exists for newly elected Prime Ministers. According to David Taras, a newly elected Prime Minister can expect a short period of uncritical coverage in which the spotlight is placed on the Prime Minister's personality, life-style, ideas, and on the new policies that he intends to put into place.[Taras 1990:133] Pierre Trudeau's ascension to the Prime Ministership in 1968 ushered in a period of Trudeaumania in which journalists wrote extensively about Trudeau's alleged mystery and charisma. Trudeau's personality held a fascination for journalists. Brian Mulroney also enjoyed an alliance phase in his relationship with the media, albeit without the passion and exuberance that accompanied Trudeaumania.[Taras 1990:133] Although Joe Clark and John Turner benefitted from a brief alliance period when they were first elected leaders of their parties, the media's need for information about personalities and policies were exhausted long before they became Prime

Minister.[Taras 1990: 133]

A second stage in the cycle of coverage described by Grossman and Kumar is called the competitive phase.[Grossman and Kumar 1981: 278] In this phase, presidents are, in John F. Kennedy's words, "reading more and enjoying it less". [Grossman Kumar 1981:279] They are under a constant barrage of criticism as opponents emerge to lead attacks on their policies; they have a record that has to be defended; and the journalists who take delight in "exposing the clay feet of politicians now feel free to wield their scalpels".[Grossman and Kumar 1981: 280] During the competitive phase, journalists are no longer interested in the president's personality or life-style as in his capacity to administer the government, manage the economy, and protect vital foreign policy interests.[Grossman and Kumar 1981: 281] Poor performances, mistakes, and scandals become front page news and lead items on television and cause the president to lose his grip on the agenda. Virtually, every modern Prime Minister has endured a competitive phase in his relationship with the media. The intensity of conflict will vary depending on the Prime Minister and the circumstances prevailing at a given time.

Grossman and Kumar describe the last phase as "detachment".[Grossman and Kumar 1981: 295] Relations are characterized by routine and formality; each side knows what it can expect from the other. Contacts between both sides are less frequent and occur in highly controlled settings.

Veteran observers believe that phases in the media's coverage of Prime Ministers are quite discernible, although not all would agree that Grossman and Kumar's description is entirely applicable in Canada. According to Jim Coutts, a former chief of staff to Pierre Trudeau, "From the elation of election night there's a steep curve that takes you to paranoia six months later. Trudeau warned the party about Trudeaumania, that the euphoria would turn into something nasty. He was prophetic." [Taras 1990:134]

Trudeau and the Media

Pierre Trudeau's relations with journalists were distant and cautious. According to David Taras:

As a former professor steeped in the nuances of political philosophy and constitutional law, he [Trudeau] disdained the media's tendency to simplify and sensationalize. He also resented the intrusions in his private life, especially the crisislike coverage given to his wife, Margaret Trudeau; and at times his contempt was palpable. [Taras 1990:139]

Although he had a few favourites such as Jack Webster, George Radwanski, Anthony Westell, and Jim Munson, Trudeau developed an intense antipathy towards journalists as a group during his tenure as Prime Minister. [Kesterton 1984:43] As Prime Minister, Trudeau made it known that he did not care what was said or written about him, and he occasionally gave reporters "a detailed account of his low opinion of this or that story or comment that had reached his attention". [McCall-Newman 1982:111] According to Brian Smith, Trudeau's attitude was

that "If you are going to judge me, then I should be able to judge you". [Taras 1990: 139]

Trudeau's animosity and resentment was reciprocated by journalists. Clive Cocking found in an informal survey of the Gallery taken in 1978 that there was "not one reporter who likes Trudeau" and that "the gallery vultures seem distinctly bloody-minded". [Cocking 1980: 31] Charles Lynch described the situation that prevailed in the late 1970's this way:

It's been total war 'tween Trudeau and the press for a long, long time...and the press gallery is just full of people who would love to get that sonofabitch, and who savour the fact that now he's on the skids they want to be there for it. [Lynch 1988: 89]

Trudeau's news conferences seemed to have a "chess match" quality. [Taras 1990:140] Trudeau's answers were nimble but his tone often aggressive. He regularly challenged the intelligence and appropriateness of questions. According to Brian Smith, "he would dismiss questions as irrelevant, attack the premise and engage in the verbal jousting that he was well known for and it was quite biting. Reporters had to be intellectually up to it". [Taras 1990:140] Mary Comber and Robert Mayne quote a former Trudeau aide as saying:

Trudeau would have in reserve a number of dramatic and controversial declarations which he freely used...to deflect questions away from... sensitive areas. [Comber and Mayne 1986: 134]

There was little repair work that could be done in Trudeau's

last term of office from 1980 to 1984. Both sides retained their earlier suspicions and animosities. By this time it was too late for damage control, the public was fully aware of the bad press and little could be done to rectify the situation.

Mulroney and the Media

Mulroney has been more conscious of the importance of media relations than any other Prime Minister. During the years that he was out of politics, following his 1976 loss of the Conservative leadership race, Mulroney sought to rebuild his political fortunes by lobbying important journalists. He was always available for interviews and was a source of inside information on developments in the Conservative Party. In a book on the 1983 leadership race, Patrick Martin, Allan Gregg and George Perlin wrote:

Quick to contact journalists with whose work he agrees and equally quick to call those who disappoint, Mulroney cajoled and bullied, leaked and stone walled his way into the professional lives of many journalists until he became able to do a little trafficking of his own. [Martin, Gregg, and Perlin 1983: 96]

When he became Prime Minister, a number of journalists took positions in his government: L. Ian MacDonald, Bill Fox, Dalton Camp, Bruce Phillips, and Luc Lavoie among others. [Martin, Gregg, and Perlin 1983:97] Moreover, in his first years in office, Mulroney was virtually obsessed with media coverage; anything that was said or written about him was devoured voraciously. Even when he travelled, videotaped newscasts and accounts of newspaper articles were sent to him

daily. Michael Gratton, a former press secretary described him as a "media junkie". [Gratton 1987: 110]

Yet, relations with the media were to sour within Mulroney's first year in office. His government was wracked by scandals and resignations among his Cabinet ministers, and he seemed to use the levers of partisan patronage with extraordinary abandon.[Taras 1990: 142] He soon faced a barrage of negative reporting and commentary that stung him deeply. As Gratton has written:

...when they started sticking the knives in him, they did so in a merciless frenzy. Since he attached so much importance to the media, the wounds went all the deeper, and left him with a deep resentment at having been betrayed by people in whom he had invested a portion of his soul. He started to hold them responsible for all his problems rather than seeking out the truly guilty parties in his own administration. I can't remember how often he railed against the media, calling the reporters ignorant fools who didn't understand anything. [Gratton 1987:110]

Part of the problem was that having made patronage a main issue during the 1984 election, Mulroney had set the standard by which he would be judged. Journalists felt that they had every right to attack him on this ground. The Gallery also became suspicious of Mulroney's penchant for exaggeration and bluster, his syrupy pretensions, and his slickness.[Gratton 1987:110] Mulroney's attitude aroused considerable cynicism and invited attempts to hold him accountable for his words.

Conclusion

The relationship between politicians and the public is conditioned to an extraordinary degree by the demands imposed by television. Television's routines, rituals, and ceremonies have altered the way that politicians perform their roles." Television", as David Taras states, " is the stage upon which the political drama takes place". [Taras 1988:40]

The power of television to mould public perception has become a political reality. Though other factors, to some, may account for the decline in popularity of Canadian leaders, the media provides the most plausible explanation.

It is evident, then, that the Prime Minister will continue to occupy centre stage in this country. Whether or not this occupancy will be deemed successful by the public will be clearly illustrated in the next chapter with an analysis of election survey data and gallup poll data.

CONCLUSION

It has become clear, then, that our leaders are the superstars of Canadian politics. In their day to day coverage of public affairs and political events, television, radio, newspapers, and magazines treat the statements and behaviour of party leaders as major news items. Even issue and policy questions are frequently portrayed in personalized terms. During election campaigns, the media coverage of party leaders intensifies greatly as reporters follow and report on the leaders' campaign tours. Given the focus of attention on these individuals in our public life, it is not surprising that they are often times the brunt of ill will.

Television's leader-centred coverage has had a profound impact on the party system. Before television, political parties played an important role as the meeting ground between leaders and the public. Citizens had to go to rallies staged by political parties to see important politicians. This function has been usurped by television. The medium reaches over the heads of the parties to link audiences to leaders directly.

The electorate is conditioned by the media's devotion to the politics of leadership. Local candidates and M.P.'s have become less important in voter's minds. In national elections, the fate of candidates for Parliament is decided largely by the perceptions of the national leaders. Even powerful Cabinet ministers, once able to assure their elections because of

their control over local party machines, are aware that their electoral survival depends on the Prime Minister's popularity, on the length of his coattails. If he can maintain broad public appeal, a Prime Minister has enhanced power vis a vis his party and Cabinet. Without a demonstrable popularity, his strength among party followers is greatly diminished and he is increasingly vulnerable to challenges. A good media image is the essential glue of party and Cabinet control. Some would argue that the ability to perform on television has largely replaced the old requirements such as patronage, elite recruitment, and the cultivation of a grass roots party organization as the key element in successful politics.

This study has presented other explanations to account for the eroding popularity of federal party leaders, yet the media seems to be the most plausible explanation. The essential question is whether the media's values and priorities militate against Prime Ministers enjoying balanced treatment. In this study the evidence has been overwhelming that indeed the media's portrayal of leaders has a tremendous impact on the public to the end that no, our leaders do not receive balanced treatment. If anything, the scales are tipped heavily in favour of the media.

He represents the most salient and visible symbol of government. The Prime Minister alone deals with the Governor General. For example, only the Prime Minister - not the Cabinet, personal aides, opposition parties, or even

Parliament as a whole -can request a dissolution of Parliament from the formal executive. Although others may be consulted, it is the Prime Minister who recommends those individuals who are to be named to the Privy Council, Senate, and other governmental institutions. Since much of the formal executive's role is only carried out on the initiative of the political executive and since the Prime Minister determines when those powers will be exercised, the Prime Minister's indirect control over the formal executive also enhances the direct control over the other elements of the political executive, such as the Cabinet.

Control over the party's organization, when combined within the principle of party discipline within Parliament, gives the Prime Minister control of the legislative branch of government. Failure by a party leader to control the party makes it difficult to be elected Prime Minister, since the public probably perceives such an individual to be lacking in the necessary leadership qualities required by the job. While the Cabinet may help to impose a fusion of powers between the executive and legislature, it is embodied to an even greater extent in the role of the Prime Minister. Because the Prime Minister stands "at the apex of the party both within Parliament and outside " he is "by far the most powerful man in the Canadian system".[Matheson1976:214] Furthermore, control over Cabinet selection gives the Prime Minister the power to make or break the political career of others. Talent,

in and of itself, is not necessarily enough for Cabinet promotion - that talent must be recognized by the Prime Minister.

What we see then, is an individual who holds the most preeminent position in government. It should come as no surprise, then, that this individual is consistently swarmed by the media. This current situation is not without long term dangers for the political system as a whole. The media's need for conflict and drama, their filtering of the Prime Minister's message, and their inherent cynicism and predilection to oppose can undermine the Prime Minister's capacity to use his position effectively. The need to survive in the media battlefield is not only becoming more time consuming, it also threatens to become the key determinant of Prime Ministerial success. Ultimately the credibility of our highest office is diminished by a journalistic ethic that prizes criticism far more than praise, the sensational over the mundane and methodical, and personality over process.

What can we expect, then, in the years to follow? Are all of our leaders destined to be disliked? Judging from the analysis in this study, the answer would have to be yes. Canadian Prime Ministers survive and enjoy power only so long as they succeed in accommodating those with whom they are obliged to deal. [Punnett 1977: 160] In the end, the exercise of Prime-Ministerial power lies in the art of living within the considerable constraints that are imposed by political

life. Clearly, as time progresses, these constraints are getting greater and greater in number so that the most any Prime Minister can hope for is a fleeting moment of popularity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Altheide, David. Creating Reality: How TV News Distorts Events. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.
- Arterton, Christopher F. "The Media Politics of Presidential Campaigns," in Race For The Presidency. ed. James David Barber, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978.
- Atkinson, Max. Our Master's Voices. London: Methuen, 1984.
- Aucoin, Peter. "The Machinery of Government: From Trudeau's Rational Management to Mulroney's Brokerage Politics", in Prime Ministers and Premiers, eds. Leslie A. Pal and David Taras. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988, pp.50-68.
- Ballard, Elizabeth and Peter Suedfeld. "Performance Ratings of Canadian Prime Ministers: Individual and Situational Factors" in Political Psychology, Vol 9, No. 4, p. 291-302, 1988.
- Bendix, R. Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978.
- Bennet, W. Lance. News: The Politics of Illusion. White Plains, New York: Longman, 1988.
- Bennis, Warren G. Why Leaders Can't Lead London: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989.
- Blondel, J. World Leaders: Heads of Government in the Post-War Period. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980.
- Broder, David. Behind the Front Page. New York: Longman, 1988.
- Brown, Robert Craig. "Fishwives, Plutocrats, Sirens and Other Curious Creatures: Some Questions about Political Leadership in Canada", in Prime Ministers and Premiers, eds. Leslie A. Pal and David Taras. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988, pp.27-33.
- Bunce, Valerie. Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Burns, James MacGregor. "The Difference Between Power Wielders and Leaders", in Political Leadership: A Source Book, ed. B Kellerman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, pp. 287-299.
- _____. "Leadership", in Political Leadership: A Source

Book, ed. B. Kellerman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, pp.419-424.

_____. Leadership. London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978.

Cahill, Jack. John Turner: The Long Run. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984.

Camp, Dalton. Gentlemen, Players and Politicians. Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1988.

Campbell, Colin S.J. "Political Leadership in Canada: Pierre Elliot Trudeau and the Ottawa Model", in Presidents and Prime Ministers, eds. Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980, pp.51-93.

_____. Governments Under Stress: Political Executives and Key Bureaucrats in Washington, London and Ottawa. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1983.

Chenier, John. "Ministers of State to Assist: Weighing the Costs and the Benefits," Canadian Public Administration, vol. 28, no.2, p.185-200.

Clark, Ian D. "Recent Changes in the Cabinet Decision-Making System in Ottawa," Canadian Public Administration, vol. 28, no. 2, p.185-200.

Clarke, Harold D., Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammett. Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections. Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1991.

Clarkson, Stephen. "The Dauphin and the Doomed: John Turner and the Liberal Party's Debacle," in Canada at the Polls, 1984: A Study of the Federal General Elections. ed. Howard R. Penniman. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1988.

Cocking, Clive. Following The Leaders. Toronto: Double-Day Canada, 1980.

Cohen, Bernard. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Comber, Mary Anne and Robert Mayne. The Newsmongers. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.

Conger, Jay A. and Rabindra N. Kanungo. Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness. London: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988.

- Courtney, John C. The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973.
- Cronin, Thomas. The State of the Presidency. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1986.
- Dahl, Robert and Deane Neubauer. Readings in Modern Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968.
- Dempson, Peter. Assignment Ottawa: Seventeen Years in the Press Gallery. Toronto: General Publishing Co., 1968.
- Desbarats, Peter. Guide to Canadian News Media. Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1989.
- Devlin, L. Patrick. "Campaign Commercials," in Television in Society. ed. Arthur Asa Berger. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1987.
- Dion, Leon. "The Concept of Political Leadership: An Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science 1, No.1 (1968), p.2-17.
- Epstein, Edward J. News from Nowhere. New York: Vintage, 1973.
- Ericson, Richard, Patricia Baranek, and Janet Chan. Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.
- Farah, Barbara and Ethel Klein. "Public Opinion Trends," in The Election of 1988. ed. Gerald Pomper. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1989.
- Fletcher, Frederick J. "The Prime Minister as Public Persuader", in Apex of Power, 2nd edn., ed. Thomas A. Hockin. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977, pp.86-111.
- _____. "The Media and the 1984 Landslide," in Canada at the Polls, 1984: A Study of the Federal General Elections. ed. Howard R. Penniman Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1988.
- Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
- Franks, C.E.S. The Parliament of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
- Fraser, Graham. Playing For Keeps. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989.

- Fraser, Graham and Ross Howard. "Commons Floor A TV Studio Where MP's Play to Camera," The Globe and Mail , 4 April, 1988, A1.
- Frizzell, Alan and Anthony Westell. The Canadian General Election of 1984. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1985.
- _____. "The Media and the Campaign," in the Canadian General Election of 1988. eds. Alan Frizzell, Jon Pammett, and Anthony Westell. Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1989.
- Gans, Herbert. Deciding What's News. New York: Vintage, 1980.
- Gardner, John W. On Leadership. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
- Gibson, F.W. Cabinet Formation and Bicultural Relations. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970.
- Gitlin, Todd. The Whole World is Watching. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1980.
- Gossage, Patrick. Close to the Charisma: My Years Between the Press and Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.
- Graber, Doris. Processing The News. New York: Longman, 1988.
- Graham, Roger. "Charisma and Canadian Politics", in Character and Circumstance: Essays in Honour of Donald Grant Creighton, ed. John S. Moir. Toronto: Macmillan, 1970.
- Graham, Ron. One-Eyed Kings. Toronto: Collins Publishers, 1986.
- Gratton, Michael. "So What Are the Boys Saying?" Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987.
- Griffith, Thomas. "More Professional, Less Human," Time, 16 November 1987.
- Grossman, Michael and Martha Kumar. Portraying the President. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- Gwyn, Richard. The Northern Magus: Pierre Trudeau and the Canadians. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980.
- Halberstam, David. The Powers That Be. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.
- Helco, Hugh. A Government of Strangers. Washington: Brookings Institute, 1977.

- Herman, Edward and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of th Mass Media. New York: Pantheon, 1988.
- Hermann, Margaret G. A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders. London: The Free Press, 1977.
- Hershey, Marjorie. "The Campaign and the Media," in The Election of 1988. ed. Gerald Pomper, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1989.
- Hertsgaard, Mark. On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1988.
- Hockin, Thomas A. "The Prime Minister and Political Leadership: An Introduction to Some Restraints and Imperatives" in Apex of Power, 2nd edn., ed. Thomas A. Hockin. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977, pp.2-21.
- Hollander, Edwin P. Leadership Dynamics: A Practical Guide to Effective Relationships. New York: Free Press, 1978.
- Hoy, Claire. Friends in High Places. Toronto: Key Porter Books Ltd., 1987.
- _____. Margin of Error. Toronot: Key Porter Books, 1989.
- Hutchison, Bruce. The Far Side of The Street. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976.
- Iyengar, Shanto and Donald Kinder. News that Matters. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- Jennings, E.E. Anatomy of Leadership: Princes, Heroes and Supermen. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
- Joyce, Ed. Prime Times, Bad Times. New York:Doubleday, 1988.
- Kesterton, W.H. A History of Journalism in Canada. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1984.
- Koch, Eric. Inside Seven Days. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1986.
- Kornberg, Allan and Harold D. Clarke. Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years. Durham, North Carolin: Duke University Press, 1983.
- _____. Citizens and Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Lasswell, Harold D. "Democratic Leadership", in Political Leadership: A Source Book, ed. B. Kellerman. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, pp.196-198.

_____. Power and Personality. New York:W.W. Norton, 1976.

Lichter, S. Robert, Stanley Rothman, and Linda Lichter. The Media Elite. Maryland: Adler and Adler, 1986.

Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. New York: Free Press, 1965.

Little, Bruce. "Switch in Power Makes Politicians Versatile Actors," Globe and Mail, January 29, 1985, B8.

Lynch, Charles. The Lynch Mob. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1988.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. translated by Harvey Mansfield, Jr. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985.

Mackie, Thomas T. and Brian W. Hogwood. "Decision Arenas in Executive Decision Making: Cabinet Committees in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science. July, 1984 Vol. 14, no. 3, p. 285-312.

Martel, Myles. Political Campaign Debates. New York: Longman, 1983.

Martin, Patrick, Allan Gregg and George Perlin. Contenders:The Tory Quest For Power. Scarborough:Prentice-Hall, 1983.

Marvick, Dwaine. Political Decision-Makers. London: The Free Press, 1977.

Matusow, Barbara. The Evening Stars. New York: Ballantine, 1983.

Mazlish, Bruce. "Leader and Led", in Political Leadership: A Source Book, ed. B. Kellerman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, pp.276-286.

McCall-Newman, Christina. Grits: An Intimate Portrait of the Liberal Party. Toronto:Macmillan of Canada, 1982.

McGregor, Gaile. The Wacousta Syndrome. Toronto: Universtiy of Toronto Press, 1985.

McInnes, Craig. "Scrums: A Tradition But Point is Obscure," The Globe and Mail, 2 December 1989, A3.

Meyrowitz, Joshua. No Sense of Place. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Morton, Desmond. "Television: Does the Image Reflect Reality?" in Politics and the Media. Toronto: Reader's Digest Foundation of Canada and Erindale College, 1981.

Murphy, Rae, Robert Chodos, and Nick Auf Der Maur. Brian Mulroney: The Boy From Baie Comeau. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Formac Publishing, 1984.

Neustadt, Richard. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960.

Newman, Peter C. The Distemper of Our Times: Canadian Politics in Transition: 1963-1968. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968.

_____. Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973.

Nesbit, Dorothy. Videostyle in Senate Campaigns. Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1988.

Nolan, Brian. King's War. Toronto: Fawcett Crest, 1988.

Ondaatje, Christopher. The Prime Ministers of Canada: Macdonald to Mulroney 1867-1985. Toronto: Pagurian Press, 1985.

Pal, Leslie A. "Hands at the Helm? Leadership and Public Policy", in Prime Ministers and Premiers, eds. Leslie A. Pal and David Taras. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988, pp.16-26.

_____. "Prime Ministers and Their Parties: The Cauldron of Leadership", in Prime Ministers and Premiers, eds. Leslie A. Pal and David Taras. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988, pp.87-96.

Paletz, David and Robert Entman. Media Power Politics. New York:

Free Press, 1981.

- Parenti, Michael. Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
- Parsons, Patrick, John Finnegan, Jr., and William Benham. "Editors and Their Roles," in Press Concentration and Monopoly. eds. Robert Picard et al. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing, 1988.
- Patterson, Thomas and Robert McClure. The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of Television Power in National Elections. New York: Putnam, 1976.
- Pearson, Lester. "Canadian Prime Ministers Discuss the Office," in Apex of Power. 2nd edn., ed. Thomas A. Hockin. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977, pp. 254-262.
- Perlin, George. "Opportunity Regained: The Tory Victory in 1984," in Canada at the Polls, 1984: A Study of the Federal General Elections, ed. Howard Penniman Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1988.
- Postman, Neil. Amusing Ourselves to Death. New York: Penguin, 1985.
- Punnett, R.M. The Prime Minister in Canadian Government and Politics. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977.
- Putnam, Robert. The Comparative Study of Political Elites. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976.
- Radwanski, George. Trudeau. Scarborough: Macmillan, 1978.
- Ranney, Austin. Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics. New York: Basic Books, 1983.
- Rosenbaum, Walter A. Political Culture. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.
- Rotenberg, Ronald. Advertising: A Canadian Perspective. Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, 1986.
- Rutherford, Paul. The Making of the Canadian Media. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978.
- _____. A Victorian Authority: The Daily Press in Late

- Nineteenth-Century Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982.
- Sabato, Larry. The Rise of Political Consultants. New York: Basic Books, 1981.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Imperial Presidency. Toronto: Popular Library, 1974.
- Schudson, Michael. "Deadlines, Datelines, and History," in Reading the News, eds. Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson. New York: Pantheon, 1986.
- Segal, Hugh. "Prospects and Proposals," in Politics and the Media. Toronto: Erindale College and The Reader's Digest Foundation of Canada, 1981.
- Seymour-Ure, Colin. "Prime Ministers, Political News and Political Places," Canadian Public Administration Summer 1989
- Seidman, Harold. Politics, Position and Power. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Sheehan, Michael. Campaigns and Elections May/June 1988.
- Simpson, Jeffrey. Discipline of Power. Toronto: Personal Library, 1980.
- Smith, Denis. "The Federal Cabinet in Canadian Politics", in Canadian Politics in the 1990's, eds. Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams. Toronto: Nelson, 1990, pp. 359-380.
- _____. "President and Parliament: The Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada", in Apex of Power, ed. Thomas A. Hockin. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977, pp. 308-325.
- Smith, Hedrick. The Power Game. New York: Random House, 1988.
- Stewart, Walter. Shrug: Trudeau in Power. Toronto: New Press, 1971.
- _____. "The Toronto Star: The Crazy Rat Syndrome," in Canadian Newspapers: The Inside Story. ed. Walter Stewart. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1980.
- Stoler, Peter. The War Against the Press. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1986.

Taras, David. "Dreamers of the Day: A Guide to Roles, Character and Performance on the Political Stage", in Prime Ministers and Premiers, eds. Robert Weyant and David Taras. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988, pp.2-15.

Taras, David and Leslie A. Pal. "The Changing Faces of Political Power in Canada," in Prime Ministers and Premiers, eds. Leslie A. Pal and David Taras. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988, pp.13-18.

_____. The Newsmakers. Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1990.

Tataryn, Lloyd. Power, Politics and the Press. Toronto: Deneau, 1985.

Tead, Ordway. The Art of Leadership. London: McGraw-Hill Inc. 1935.

Thoradson, Bruce. "Posture and Policy: Leadership in Canada's External Affairs" in International Journal. no. 31, 1976.

Troyer, Warner. The Sound and The Fury. Toronto: Personal Library, 1980.

Trudeau, Pierre Elliot. Federalism and the French Canadians. Toronto: Macmillan, 1968.

Tuchman, Gaye. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. New York: The Free Press, 1978.

Tucker, Robert C. Politics as Leadership. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1981.

Wapshott, Nicholas and George Brock. Thatcher. London: Futura, 1983.

Wearing, Joseph. "President or Prime Minister", in Apex of Power, 2nd edn., ed. Thomas A. Hockin. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977, pp. 308-325.

Weber, Max. "Types of Authority", in Political Leadership: A Source Book, ed. B. Kellerman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, pp.232-244.

Weller, Patrick. First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in

- Westminster Systems. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985.
- West, Laurie. "The Man in the Middle: The Role of the Prime Minister's Press Secretary," Honours Research Project, School of Journalism, Carleton University, April, 1986.
- Westell, Anthony and Carman Cumming. "Canadian Media and the National Imperative," in Government and the News Media. ed. Dan Nimmo and Michael Mansfield. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 1982.
- Whitaker, Reg. The Government Party. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- Wicks, Ben. So You Want to be Prime Minister? Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. The Nursing Father: Moses as a Political Leader. Tuscaloosa, Ala: University of Alabama Press, 1984.
- Williams, Shirley. Politics is for People. London: Penguin Books, 1981.
- Willner, Ruth Ann. "Charismatic Leadership", in Political Leadership: A Source Book, ed. B. Kellerman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, pp.245-249.
- _____. Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory. Princeton University: Centre of International Studies, 1968.
- Wilson, John. "The Canadian Political Cultures: Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol.7, No. 3 (Sept.), p. 438-483.
- Winn, Conrad. "Elections" in Political Parties in Canada, ed. by Conrad Winn and John McMenemy. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976.
- Wolfe, Morris. Jolts: The TV Wasteland and the Canadian Oasis. Toronto: Lorimer, 1985.
- Wolfenstein, E. Victor. The Revolutionary Personality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.


Young, Walter D. "Leadership in Canadian Politics," in Approaches to Canadian Politics, 2nd edn., ed. John H. Redekop Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1983, pp. 267-291.

Young, Walter D. and J.T. Morley. "The Premier and the Cabinet" in The Reins of Power, ed. J.T. Morley, et al. Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1983.

Zaleznik, Abraham. "Charismatic and Consensus Leaders: A Psychological Comparison" in Contemporary Issues in Leadership, ed. William Rosebach and Robert Taylor. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1984. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1983, pp. 267-291.

FIGURE 1.1

Thermometer Scale Ratings of Party Leaders: 1968-88



Source: Absent Mandate 1991.

FIGURE 1.2

Feelings Toward Federal Party Leaders

1984 Panel




FIGURE 1.3


Most Frequently Mentioned Images of Pierre Trudeau: 1968-80

	Positive	%	Negative	%
A. 1968 (N = 2760)	Youth	17	Kissing women	9
	Honesty, sincerity	13	Appearance, dress	5
	Personality in general	10	Lack of dignity	5
	Intelligence, competence	10	Swinger, playboy	4
	Policies in general	8	Personality in general	3
B. 1974 (N = 1203)	Intelligence	16	Arrogance	8
	Speaking ability	10	Travels too much	5
	Honesty	10	Doesn't attend to business	4
	Leadership	9	Policy on inflation	3
	Personality in general	9	Dodges issues	3
C. 1979 (N = 1318)	Intelligence	24	General approach	3
	Leadership	12	Arrogance	18
	Speaking ability	9	Too dictatorial	7
	Honesty	7	Conceited	4
	Personality in general	7	General attitude	4
D. 1980 (N = 860)	Intelligence	26	Handling of Quebec situation	3
	Leadership	18	Arrogance	22
	Speaking ability	8	Too dictatorial	5
	Experience	4	Dishonesty	4
	Personality in general	5	General attitude	4
			Conceited	3

Source: Absent Mandate 1991.

FIGURE 1.4

1984/1988 Thermometer



Panel Study

FIGURE 1.5

Most Frequently Mentioned Images of Ed Broadbent: 1979-88

	Positive	%	Negative	%
A. 1979 (N = 1318)	Honesty	12	His party, politics	6
	Speaking ability	10	Too socialistic	3
	Intelligence	10	NDP philosophy	2
	Personality in general	5	His policies	2
	Concern for ordinary people	4		
B. 1980 (N = 860)	Honesty	15	His party, politics	6
	Speaking ability	12	Too socialistic	4
	Intelligence	8	His policies, ideas	3
	Leadership ability	7	Not realistic	2
	Personality in general	6	NDP philosophy	2
C. 1984 (N = 3380)	Honesty, sincerity	18	His party, politics	7
	Concern for ordinary people	14	His policies, ideas	3
	Speaking ability	9	Ties to unions	2
	Fights for beliefs	8	Too socialistic	2
	Personality in general	4	Speaks French poorly	2
D. 1988 (N = 1200)	Honesty, sincerity	28	His party, politics	7
	Speaking ability	7	Speaks French poorly	4
	Personality in general	6	His policies, ideas	3
	Concern for ordinary people	4	Too socialistic	2
	Works hard, tries	3	Ties to unions	2
E. Personality traits: 1984 (7-point scale)				
Decent	5.4	Listens	4.6	
Sincere	5.2	Slick	3.6	
Sure of himself	5.2	Dull	3.5	
Represents change	4.9	Ruthless	3.1	
Commands respect	4.8	Arrogant	3.0	
Warm	4.8	Shallow	2.9	
Competent	4.7	Nervous	2.9	

Source: Absent Mandate 1991.

FIGURE 1.6

Feelings Toward Federal Party Leaders

1988 Panel




FIGURE 1.7

Most Frequently Mentioned Images of John Turner: 1984-88

	Positive	%	Negative	%
A. 1984 (N = 3380)	Honesty, sincerity	14	Poor speaker	6
	Appearance, looks	6	Not sincere, untrustworthy	5
	Personality in general	4	Not dynamic, wishy-washy	5
	Speaking ability	3	Out of politics too long	4
	Success in business	3	Can't control his own party	3
B. 1988 (N = 1200)	Courage, persistence,		Can't control his own party	9
	hard work	13	Indecisive, unsure,	
	Honesty, sincerity	11	wishy-washy	8
	Good speaker, debater	5	Not sincere, untrustworthy	7
	Stand on free trade	3	Attitude, personality in	
	Appearance, looks	2	general	7
			Poor speaker	5
C. Personality traits: 1984 (7-point scale)				
Decent	5.1	Dull	4.0	
Nervous	5.0	Warm	3.9	
Sincere	4.5	Listens	3.9	
Commands respect	4.3	Arrogant	3.9	
Competent	4.2	Shallow	3.7	
Slick	4.1	Represents change	3.6	
Sure of himself	4.1	Ruthless	3.5	

Source: Absent Mandate 1991.

FIGURE 1.9


Most Frequently Mentioned Images of Brian Mulroney: 1984-88

	Positive	%	Negative	%
A. 1984 (N = 3380)	Honesty, sincerity	11	Not sincere,	8
	Speaking ability	8	untrustworthy	5
	Intelligent, capable	6	Too many promises	4
	Leadership ability	5	Too smooth, slick	3
	Confidence, self-assurance	5	Arrogant	2
B. 1988 (N = 1200)	Leadership ability, performance	7	Not sincere, can't be trusted, phony	19
	Speaking ability	7	Pompous, arrogant	6
	Honesty, sincerity	6	Too smooth, slick	4
	Attitude, approach	5	Indecisive, vague	3
	Works hard, tries	3	Not a leader	2
C. Personality traits: 1984 (7-point scale)				
Sure of himself	5.9	Listens	4.8	
Represents change	5.5	Warm	4.8	
Decent	5.3	Ruthless	3.8	
Competent	5.3	Arrogant	3.8	
Commands respect	5.2	Shallow	3.4	
Slick	5.0	Dull	3.1	
Sincere	4.8	Nervous	2.9	

Source: Absent Mandate 1991.

FIGURE 2.0


Exposure To Media 1979 and 1984



Source: Absent Mandate 1991.

FIGURE 2.1

Debate Performance 1984 and 1988



Source: Absent Mandate 1991.

FIGURE 2.3

Most Important Election Issues: 1974-88

	1974	1979	1980	1984	1988
Economic Issues					
The economy in general	5	11	9	17	2
Inflation, cost of living, wage and price controls	46	14	14	2	—
Taxes	3	8	3	3	4
Government spending, the deficit, the budget	3	4	17	12	7
Unemployment, jobs	3	10	4	36	2
Free trade	—	—	—	—	88
Other economic issues	3	1	1	3	—
Confederation Issues					
National unity, intergovern- mental relations, the constitu- tion	2	10	7	2	6
Bilingualism, language	3	3	—	1	2
Quebec, separatism, the referendum	1	15	6	2	—
Resource Issues					
Oil prices, development, energy policy	2	4	31	1	—
Environment, pollution	—	5	1	1	9
Social Issues					
Housing, health, medicare, pensions, women's issues	12	5	2	11	14
Other Issues					
Foreign policy, defence	2	2	3	3	1
Leaders, leadership	6	14	15	8	5
Change, the parties, retrospec- tive evaluations	1	8	8	14	1
Trust, patronage, majority government, the polls	7	1	4	4	1
All other issues	3	2	2	4	3
None, No Important Issues, Don't Know					
	30	28	22	25	5
N=	(2445)	(2668)	(1786)	(3377)	(1202)

NOTE: Percentages are rounded, and do not add up to 100% because two responses were coded for some respondents.

Source: Absent Mandate 1991.